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This paper examines whether the SOX 302 and 906 provisions improve quarterly 
financial reporting quality.  In the post SOX 302 and 906 environment, managers are required to 
certify the accuracy of the quarterly financial statements, and false certification carries new 
criminal penalties.  Specifically, this paper studies whether, on a quarterly basis, the absolute 
value of performance-adjusted abnormal accruals decline following the implementation of SOX 
302 and 906.  My results indicate that quarterly financial reporting improves after SOX 302 and 
906 for firms that exhibit aggressive earnings management in the pre-SOX period, while 
quarterly financial reporting quality decreases for firms that exhibit low earnings management in 
the pre-SOX period.   These results suggest that SOX 302 and 906 might be more effective at 
constraining earnings management behavior for those firms that had used it most aggressively 
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I.  Introduction 
Following disclosure of some of the most egregious corporate frauds in history,
1
 
Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX).  One of the primary goals of SOX is to 
improve financial reporting quality for public companies.  The provisions of Section 302 require 
the CEO and CFO of a public company to personally certify the financial statements, including 
the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting and any material changes in internal 
control (Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002).
2
  Section 906 imposes severe criminal penalties for false 
management certifications made knowingly or willfully; these penalties far surpass the previous 
penalties for lying to the auditors.  The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) clearly 
intends that managements’ increased ownership of and liability for the accuracy of the financial 
statements, created by Sections 302 and 906, would improve quarterly (and annual) financial 
reporting quality.  According to President George W. Bush, these SOX provisions were intended 
to hold a CEO to his word: ―…the signature of the CEO should also be his or her personal 
certification of the veracity and fairness of the financial disclosures.  When you sign a statement, 
you’re pledging your word, and you should stand behind it‖ (President Bush's Speech from Wall 
Street  2002). 
However, it may be true that the personal certification requirement is no more than 
symbolic, as the provisions of SOX do not change the existing law related to officer liability for 
a company’s financial statements.  Even before SOX, antifraud law and the rules governing the 
disclosure of documents to the SEC placed responsibility on corporate managers and directors 
                                                 
1 Adelphia, Enron, Global Crossing, Tyco, Waste Management, WorldCom, and others.  
2 The scope of this certification surpasses the assertions previously made in the management letter provided to the 




for both the accuracy and the completeness of financial statement disclosure, and stated the 
penalty for the failure to disclose (Alverson 2005; Cunningham 2002; Fairfax 2002).  Therefore, 
whether SOX Sections 302 and 906 actually affect a company’s quarterly financial reporting 
quality is an empirical question, which I address in this paper.   
In addition to determining quarterly financial reporting quality following the 
implementation of SOX Sections 302 and 906, I propose that, because these sections directly 
affect only the cost-benefit function of management (not the auditors), these provisions offer 
researchers a unique environment to try to disentangle the ―joint measure of financial reporting 
quality‖ that is present in so much of our literature.  In most research designs it is not possible to 
disentangle the separate effects of management and auditors on reporting quality and, as a result, 
most studies can only evaluate financial reporting quality as a joint measure of the quality of 
management reporting and the quality of the auditor.  Because SOX 302 and 906 directly change 
only the consequences (liabilities) to managers, these provisions, in the quarterly reporting 
environment, should allow us to try to separate these effects.  These provisions do not directly 
change the auditor’s role in the quarterly financial reporting process; both before and after the 
implementation of these provisions, auditors are responsible for reviewing (not auditing) the 
quarterly financial statements on a contemporaneous basis.    
Existing literature indicates that investors value quarterly earnings numbers and that 
managers appear to use earnings management techniques to avoid negative earnings surprises.  
This paper adds to that literature by providing evidence of the effect of SOX Sections 302 and 
906 on quarterly earnings management, and, therefore, on quarterly financial reporting quality.  




accruals using the performance-adjusted Modified Jones model (Dechow et al. 1995; Kothari et 
al. 2005) including the Ball and Shivakumar (2006) nonlinear specification.  In this model, 
accruals quality is measured by the extent to which accruals are captured by fitted values 
obtained by regressing total accruals on changes in revenues, fixed assets, cash flows from 
operations, a binary variable indicating if cash flow from operations is negative, and an 
interaction term of the last two variables.  In addition to evaluating the change in total abnormal 
accruals following the implementation of SOX 302 and 906, I separately examine firms with 
positive (income increasing) and negative (income decreasing) abnormal accruals in the pre-
SOX period and firms with relatively high (aggressive) and relatively low abnormal accruals in 
the pre-SOX period.  Because SOX focuses on financial reporting quality, the regulation does 
not differentiate between the various motivations for firms to engage in abnormal accruals, 
however, it is an empirical question as to whether SOX has a differential effect on positive or 
negative accruals or on firms that had relatively higher or relatively lower abnormal accruals pre-
SOX.     
The quarterly reporting environment is an ideal setting to look at managements’ actions 
for two primary reasons.  First, previous research indicates that quarterly financial statements are 
subject to more management judgment than are annual financial statements because Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) allows some discretion in the quarterly timing of 
recording certain adjustments.
3
   Second, quarterly financial statements are reviewed but not 
                                                 
3 While quarterly revenues are recognized on the same basis as annual fiscal periods, APB 28 allows certain costs, 
that must be expensed during the year, to be deferred or accrued at the end of an interim quarter based on  




audited by the external auditor, potentially allowing more management discretion (Mendenhall 
and Nichols 1988).  I anticipate that Sections 302 and 906 will increase the quality of reported 
quarterly earnings both by providing an incentive to managers to improve their estimation 
process and by curbing deliberate earnings management.   
The results of my tests indicate that quarterly financial reporting quality improves in the 
post-SOX period for the 40% of firms in my sample that exhibited the most aggressive earnings 
management in the pre-SOX period.  These results are consistent for the full sample of 
aggressive earnings management firms in all four quarters and for the subsample of firms with 
aggressive negative abnormal accruals in the pre-SOX period.  For the subsample of firms with 
aggressive positive abnormal accruals in the pre-SOX period, the results are consistent for 
quarters 1, 2, and 4; there was no difference in abnormal accruals for these firms in quarter 3.  
Interestingly, quarterly financial reporting quality declines in the post-SOX period for the 60% of 
firms in my sample that demonstrated low earnings management in the pre-SOX period.  These 
results are consistent for the full sample of low earnings management firms in all four quarters 
and for each of the subsamples of firms with both positive and negative abnormal accruals in the 
pre-SOX period.   
The conflicting results for aggressive earnings management and low earnings 
management firms indicate that SOX 302 and 906 have a differential effect on firms based on 
their pre-SOX earnings management levels.  While SOX does not specifically target aggressive 
earnings management firms, it is intuitive that the regulation curtailed the earnings management 
                                                                                                                                                             
bonuses, warranty costs, advertising costs) may be recorded to expense in interim quarters based on forecasted 




behavior of these firms to a greater degree.  It is more surprising, perhaps, that firms who 
exhibited low earnings management behavior pre-SOX would have increased their earnings 
management behavior in the post-SOX period.     
This study makes several contributions to the literature.  First, the goal of Sections 302 
and 906 is to improve both quarterly and annual financial reporting and this study provides 
evidence that quarterly financial reporting improves for aggressive earnings management firms 
after the implementation of these provisions.  Second, because SOX 302 and 906 primarily affect 
managements’ incentives to improve quarterly financial reporting quality, and financial reporting 
quality improves for aggressive earnings management firms in interim quarters as well as the 
fourth quarter, this study provides some evidence that management has improved financial 
reporting quality separate from the effect of the auditor on the financial statements.  Third, in an 
environment that continues to debate the implementation of SOX Section 404 for non-
accelerated filers, this study provides evidence of improved financial reporting quality for non-
accelerated filers following the implementation of Sections 302 and 906.  Specifically, my 
results indicate that aggressive earnings management for non-accelerated filers decreased in all 
four quarters while aggressive earnings management for accelerated filers only decreased in 
quarters 3 and 4.  Fourth, because my results indicate improved financial reporting quality for 
aggressive earnings management firms, this study provides some indication of an association 
between increased individual criminal liability and changes in managers’ behaviors when faced 
with relatively higher potential personal cost versus relatively lower potential personal cost while 




policy setters and regulators (SEC and PCAOB), auditors, investors, academic researchers, and 
managers.   
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section II describes the background 
of SOX, the importance of quarterly reporting, and the measurement of financial reporting 
quality and then develops the research hypotheses tested in this study.  Section III discusses 
research design including sample selection, model selection and variable definition.  Section IV 
presents and discusses the results.  Section V defines additional analyses and the related results.  







II. Background and Hypotheses 
As a response to the extensive corporate frauds of the late 1990’s and early 2000’s, and in 
light of the growing participation of millions of Americans in the capital markets, Congress 
signed into law the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 on July 30, 2002.  SOX was intended to 
reinforce corporate accountability and to restore investor confidence in corporate financial 
reporting.  In his July 9, 2002 speech on Wall Street, President George W. Bush stated that he 
was ―calling for a new ethic of personal responsibility in the business community, an ethic that 
will increase investor confidence‖ (President Bush's Speech from Wall Street  2002). 
Selected Sarbanes-Oxley Act Provisions  
SOX instituted many corporate reporting, corporate governance and auditor-related 
changes including Sections 302, 906 and 404.  Section 302 of SOX became effective for all SEC 
registrants for fiscal years ending after August 29, 2002.  Section 302 requires corporate 
executives (CEO and CFO) to certify in each annual or quarterly report filed with the SEC that:  
1. the executive has reviewed the report filed; 
2. based on the executive’s knowledge, the report does not contain any untrue or 
misleading fact, nor does it omit any material fact necessary to make the filing not 
misleading; 
3. based on the executive’s knowledge, the financial statements and other financial 
information included in the filed report fairly present, in all material respects, the 
financial condition and results of operations for the relevant periods; 
4. the signing executives are responsible for establishing and maintaining internal 




made known to the executives, have evaluated the effectiveness of the internal 
controls as of a date within 90 days prior to the report date, and have presented in the 
report their conclusions about the effectiveness of their internal controls based on 
their evaluation as of that date; 
5. the signing executives (a) have disclosed to the auditors and the audit committee all 
significant deficiencies in the design or operation of internal controls which could 
adversely affect the company’s ability to record, process, summarize and report 
financial data, (b) have identified any material weaknesses in internal controls for the 
external auditors, and (c) have identified any fraud, whether material or not, that 
involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the internal 
control process; 
6. the signing executives have indicated in the report whether or not there have been any 
significant changes in internal control subsequent to the report date, including any 
corrective actions relative to significant deficiencies and material weaknesses.   




Some legal professionals have stated that the provisions of SOX have ―altered 
significantly the prosecutorial landscape on which the Justice Department and agency 
investigations will play out ‖(Clayton and Mackintosh 2002).  Specifically, Section 302 targets 
the preferred defense of ―who me?‖ offered by individual senior managers during a corporate 
fraud investigation.  Using this defense, the senior manager usually demonstrated that he had no 
                                                 




knowledge of the problem and would have remedied the problem if he had known and, the 
defense went, because the problem was a corporate issue not an individual issue, the senior 
manager should not be charged.  Section 302 now requires by law that senior managers maintain 
a system of internal controls designed to ensure that material information concerning corporate 
activities are made known to them.  Additionally, the senior management of a company is 
responsible for validating that the system of internal controls is functional.  Fairfax (2002) states 
that the 302 certification requirement is not nominal, but rather subjects a senior manager, who 
signs the certification knowing that it contains material inaccuracies, to both civil and criminal 
liability.   
Recently several accounting studies have looked at the impact of Section 302 on financial 
reporting.  In June 2004, McEnroe (2007) surveyed CFOs of the Fortune 500 firms and 500 audit 
partners from the 33 largest audit firms by revenue and determined that the respondents 
perceived that SOX reduced earnings management only a little more than 25% of the time.  
McEnroe hypothesized that Section 302 would result in improved financial reporting quality 
because managers could no longer use GAAP as a safe harbor defense against charges of 
creative accounting;
5
 however, his results indicate that CFOs and audit partners did not perceive 
an overall decrease in earnings management.     
A few studies examine companies disclosing material weaknesses under Section 302.  Ge 
and Mc Vay (2005) provide a descriptive analysis of firms reporting at least one Section 302 
material weakness.  They find that poor internal control is usually associated with insufficient 
                                                 
5 SOX Section 302(a) explicitly states that fair presentation of the financial statements is not limited to the assertion 
of compliance with GAAP.  Previous audit report language indicated that the financial statements were fairly stated 




resources allocated to accounting controls.  They also find that material weaknesses in internal 
controls are usually related to deficient revenue recognition policies, inadequate segregation of 
duties, deficiencies in the end-of-period reporting process, deficiencies in accounting policies 
and inadequate account reconciliations.   
Doyle et al. (2007) examine the relation between accruals quality and internal controls for 
firms disclosing a material weakness under either Section 302 or Section 404 from August 2002 
to November 2005.  These authors determine that internal control weaknesses are generally 
associated with poorly estimated accruals that are not realized as cash flows.
6
  Interestingly, they 
also find that material weakness disclosures made under Section 302 seem to be more strongly 
associated with lower accruals quality than are those made under Section 404.  They suggest that 
these findings are due to the increased level of scrutiny provided by Section 404; Section 404 
requires that the external auditor provide an audit opinion on the internal control environment.  
This would suggest two things relevant to my study.  First, the role of the auditor may have a 
significant impact on a company’s accrual quality; this study examines the role of management 
(separate, as much as possible, from the role of the auditor) in improving financial reporting 
quality when there are new incentives for them to do so.  Second, as Section 404 has yet to be 
implemented by non-accelerated filers, the results of my study may inform the debate over 
whether Section 404 might improve financial reporting quality beyond the provisions of SOX 
that are already in effect for non-accelerated filers.   
Similar to Doyle et al. (2007), Bédard (2006) examines the association between 
companies disclosing a material weakness under either Section 302 or Section 404 and 
                                                 




unexpected accruals in the year of the material weakness disclosure.
7
  Bédard finds that the 
absolute level of unexpected accruals increases in the year a material weakness is disclosed.  
This author attributes these results to managements’ reversal of earlier accruals that were too 
large, either voluntarily or at the auditor’s request, indicating improved earnings quality.  
Together these studies would indicate that for companies disclosing a material weakness under 
either Section 302 or 404, generally accruals were poorly estimated during the period preceding 
the material weakness disclosure and accruals quality improved in the year of disclosure.
8
       
Lobo and Zhou (2006) examine both earnings management and conservatism for the two 
years prior to SOX and the two years following SOX.  These authors find that, similar to the 
studies above, firms are more conservative according to both measures post-SOX than they were 
pre-SOX.   
Cohen et al.(2008) examine whether the time period leading up to the passage of SOX 
was characterized by a widespread increase in earnings management, or if SOX was precipitated 
primarily by a few highly publicized events, and whether the passage of SOX resulted in lower 
earnings management.  These authors examine annual accrual-based earnings management as 
well as ―real‖ earnings management
9
 during three time periods (pre-SOX, pre-fraud 1987 – 
1999; pre-SOX scandal period 2000 – 2001; and post-SOX 2002 – 2005), focusing on changes 
and levels of equity based compensation for executives as the motivation for earnings 
management.  Overall, their results indicate that annual accrual-based earnings management 
                                                 
7 This author examines material weakness disclosures from September 2002 to September 2005. 
8 The disclosure of material weaknesses does not affect my study as only eight companies in my sample disclosed 
material weaknesses in 2003. 




increased steadily until the passage of SOX in 2002, after which there was a significant decline.  
Conversely, ―real‖ earnings management activities declined prior to the passage of SOX, and 
subsequently increased.  Combined, these results indicate that managers switched from accrual-
based to ―real‖ earnings management as a consequence of SOX.  Lastly, Cohen et al. (2008) 
provide evidence that increases in accrual-based earnings management pre-SOX are associated 
with increases in the fraction of equity based compensation received by executives.     
By using annual earnings management measures, each of the above studies examines 
―joint measures‖ of financial reporting quality.  There are two significant differences between 
these studies and my study.  First, I examine quarterly versus annual financial reporting quality.  
Second, by using the quarterly reporting environment following the implementation of Sections 
302 and 906, my study offers some opportunity to disentangle managements’ effect on financial 
reporting quality from the auditor’s effect on financial reporting quality.   
Section 906 requires that each periodic financial report containing financial statements 
filed with the SEC include a written statement by the CEO and CFO certifying that the report 
fully complies with the regulations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that the 
information in the report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and 
results of operations of the filer.
10
  An example of the CEO certification under SOX Section 906 
is included in Appendix 1, Exhibit 3 (CFO certifications are very similar).
11
 
Section 906 also imposes severe criminal penalties for CEOs and CFOs who knowingly 
or willfully provide false certifications of periodic financial reports.  Executives, who knowingly 
                                                 
10 This sounds similar to the provisions of Section 302, however Section 906 additionally requires CEOs and CFOs 
to certify that the report ―fully complies‖ with the requirements of the Securities Exchange Act. 




certify a filing that does not meet all of the requirements of this section, can be fined not more 
than $1,000,000, or be imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.  Additionally, anyone who 
willfully certifies a statement as noted above, knowing that the filing does not meet all of the 
requirements of this section, can be fined not more than $5,000,000, or be imprisoned not more 
than 20 years, or both.   
To date, Section 906 has not been the subject of much accounting research.  Levinsohn 
(2003) cites a June 2003 survey by the Association for Financial Professionals
12
 regarding the 
prevalence of a ―subcertification‖ affidavit among corporate managers.
13
    Among the 555 
members and non-members who responded to the survey, 37% of those professionals who work 
for public companies were asked to sign an affidavit certifying the accuracy of the financial 
information they provided.  Nearly all of those who were asked to sign, did sign.  The survey 
also found that financial professionals providing ―subcertification‖ did so for a median of three 
items in their company’s financial reports.  Specifically, of those who work for a public company 
and provided ―subcertification‖, 63% certified disclosures in Management Discussion and 
Analysis, 60% certified specific account balances, 60% certified compliance with company 
policies, and 58% certified the adequacy of internal controls.  The frequency and scope of 
―subcertifications‖ would seem to indicate that CEOs and CFOs considered the penalties 
identified in Section 906 to be concerning.   
                                                 
12 http://www.afponline.org 
13 Levinsohn suggests that CEOs and CFOs require ―subcertification‖ because they typically do not personally 




Section 404 of SOX became effective for accelerated filers for fiscal years ending after 
November 15, 2004.
14
  Section 404 requires that each annual report (1) contain an internal 
control report which states the responsibility of management for establishing and maintaining an 
adequate internal control system and related procedures for financial reporting; (2) contain an 
assessment by management of the effectiveness of the internal control structure and procedures 
at the end of the most recent fiscal year; and (3) contain a statement that the audit firm issuing 
the audit report attests to, and reports on, the assessment of internal controls made by 
management. 
This study is interested only in the effect of Section 302 certifications and the Section 
906 penalties on quarterly financial reporting quality, as it is within this environment that I can 
offer some contribution regarding the actions and motivations of management separate from the 
actions and motivations of the auditor.  The Section 404 certifications require both 
managements’ certification and an auditor’s opinion resulting in financial statements that provide 
a joint measure of financial reporting quality.  In order to isolate the effects of Sections 302 and 
906 from those of Section 404, I compare the quarterly financial reporting quality for 2001 and 
2003.
15
     
Importance of Quarterly Reporting 
Existing literature indicates that quarterly earnings numbers are valuable to investors.  
Beaver (1998) developed three theoretical links between earnings and share prices: current 
                                                 
14 Accelerated filers are defined by SEC rule 13b-2 and generally refer to public companies with market 
capitalization of at least $75 million.  The effective date was extended 45 days for accelerated filers with a market 
capitalization of less than $700 million as of November 2004 (Federal Register  2004). 
15 Section 302 and 906 became effective in 2002 and Section 404 became effective in late 2004, so this research 




earnings provide information to predict future earnings, future earnings provide information 
about future dividends, and future dividends provide information to determine share value.  
Extensive literature has shown that negative earnings surprises often have severe adverse 
valuation consequences (Brown and Caylor 2005; Dechow et al. 2003; Skinner and Sloan 2002) 
and that executives appear to use earnings management techniques in order to avoid negative 
earnings surprises (Barton and Simko 2002; Bartov et al. 2002; Burgstahler and Eames 2006; 
Matsumoto 2002).   
Management can influence interim quarter earnings for two primary reasons: first the 
accounting rules allow for more management judgment when reporting earnings for interim 
quarters and second, auditors review, but do not audit, interim period results.  The Accounting 
Principles Board Opinion No. 28 - Interim Financial Reporting (APB 28) contains GAAP for 
interim financial statements (Accounting Principles Board Opinion No. 28: Interim Financial 
Reporting  1973).  Specifically, APB 28 states that the accounting profession adopted an integral 
approach for interim financial reporting (as opposed to a discrete approach)
16
.  Under an integral 
approach, the fiscal year is the primary reporting period and interim reports are integral parts of 
the annual reporting period.  Under this approach, interim revenues are recognized on the same 
basis as for the entire fiscal year, while certain costs that must be expensed during the fiscal year 
may be accrued or deferred at the end of an interim period based on managers’ expectations for 
the remainder of the year.   APB 28 requires that interim reports contain reasonable estimates of 
costs or expenses based on all available information applied consistently across periods.  
                                                 
16 Under the discrete approach each interim period is viewed as a separate accounting period and the same expense 
recognition principles would be applied to interim and annual reports.  The discrete methodology would not allow 




However, period costs that benefit more than one interim period may be expensed as incurred or 
allocated between interim periods based on several methods.
17
  The use of managers’ 
expectations to form cost estimates in an interim period can provide managers with greater 
influence over quarterly earnings than over fourth quarter earnings. 
The fact that quarterly earnings are reviewed but not audited, also allows more 
management discretion over quarterly results.  Statement on Auditing Standards No. 100: Interim 
Financial Information (SAS 100) provides guidance to auditors of public companies regarding 
the review of interim financial information  (Statement on Auditing Standards No. 100: Interim 
Financial Information  2002).  SAS 100 states that a review of interim financial information is 
significantly different from an audit of financial information because a review consists primarily 
of inquiry and analytical procedures while an audit includes substantive audit tests and the 
collection of corroborative evidence.  An example of an auditor’s report for a review of a 
quarterly filing is included in Appendix 1, Exhibit 4.
18
  The limited scope of the auditor’s 
involvement in the quarterly financial reporting process potentially allows management more 
discretion and provides a unique environment for this research project to separate the joint 
measure of financial reporting quality.   
Measuring Quarterly Financial Reporting Quality 
In this study, I investigate whether Sections 302 and 906 provisions result in changes to 
managers’ behaviors, resulting in improved quarterly financial reporting quality as proxied by 
earnings management.  In recent years, the SEC has made a connection between earnings 
                                                 
17 For example: estimate of time period expired, benefit received, expected sales, expected volumes, etc.   




management and restatements or improper accounting (Public Accounting Report  1998).  
Additionally, in a 1998 speech, then SEC Chairman Levitt made a direct connection between 
earnings management, earnings quality and the quality of financial reporting (Chairman Levitt 
Speech 1998).  Previous research has used accruals quality as a proxy for earnings management 
and financial reporting quality and this paper will do the same.   
Management accruals can be of poor quality for two basic reasons.  First, management 
could intentionally bias accruals in order to manage earnings to a desirable level.  Second, 
accruals can contain unintentional management errors in accrual estimation caused by either a 
difficulty in the estimation of an event or because there are errors in the estimation that the 
internal control environment does not detect (Doyle et al. 2007). 
Previous research indicates that managers use discretionary accruals to intentionally 
manage earnings to their benefit.  In these studies, managers are presumed to have evaluated 
their cost-benefit function and decide to intentionally manage earnings.  Sections 302 and 906 
increase the cost side of this function, while the benefit side of the equation remains constant, 
potentially resulting in reduced intentional earnings management.   
Several research papers have separately examined aggressive earnings management firms 
and low earnings management firms in their research design (Bédard et al. 2004; Johl et al. 2007; 
Koh 2007).  The results for these papers indicate that firms that exhibit aggressive earnings 
management are differentially associated with firm level corporate governance characteristics, 
institutional investor type and audit opinions.  It seems reasonable that SOX 302 and 906 could 
differentially affect managers’ behaviors based on whether a firm exhibits aggressive earnings 




I test the relation between Sections 302 and 906 and quarterly financial reporting quality 
as measured by a reduction in quarterly earnings management between the ―same-quarter‖ 
periods before and after the implementation of these Sections.  I limit my study to companies 
with December 31
st
 year-ends in order to eliminate the confounding effects of different year-end 
dates and different seasonality within industries.
19
  The four calendar quarters of 2001 are 
defined as the pre-SOX Sections 302 and 906 period and the four calendar quarters of 2003 as 
the post-SOX Sections 302 and 906 period.  For example, this study will compare abnormal 
accruals for Q1 (Q2, Q3, Q4) of 2001 with abnormal accruals for Q1 (Q2, Q3, Q4) of 2003.   
I expect that if Sections 302 and 906 are effective in modifying corporate managers’ 
behavior, quarterly abnormal accruals post-SOX Sections 302 and 906 (2003) will be lower than 
the corresponding quarterly abnormal accruals pre-SOX Sections 302 and 906 (2001).  This 
leads to my first hypothesis (expressed in alternate form): 
H1a:   There will be a decline in the absolute value of performance –adjusted abnormal 
accruals for each of the four quarters post-SOX Sections 302 and 906 (2003) as 
compared to the respective same-quarter pre-SOX Sections 302 and 906 (2001) 
(i.e., company abnormal accruals will become closer to zero). 
 
One of the goals of SOX is to improve overall financial reporting quality, and for this 
reason, I also expect that, in addition to an overall decrease in abnormal accruals, after the 
implementation of these provisions, there will also be a decrease for each of the two subsets of 
companies: those that had positive (income increasing) abnormal accruals and those that had 
negative (income decreasing) abnormal accruals in the pre-SOX Sections 302 and 906 period as 
                                                 
19 For example Q2 will not be comparable between a retailer with a 12/31 year end and a retailer with a 6/30 year 




compared to the post-SOX Sections 302 and 906 period.  This leads to my second and third 
hypotheses (expressed in alternate form): 
H2a: For companies with positive abnormal accruals (performance-adjusted) pre-SOX 
Sections 302 and 906, there will be a decline in the value of abnormal accruals for 
each of the four quarters post-SOX Sections 302 and 906 (2003) as compared to 
the respective same-quarter pre-SOX Sections 302 and 906 (2001) (i.e., company 
abnormal accruals will become closer to zero). 
 
H3a: For companies with negative abnormal accruals (performance-adjusted) pre-SOX 
Sections 302 and 906, there will be a decline in the value of abnormal accruals for 
each of the four quarters post-SOX Sections 302 and 906 (2003) as compared to 
the respective same-quarter pre-SOX Sections 302 and 906 (2001) (i.e., company 
abnormal accruals will become closer to zero). 
 
While the provisions of SOX 302 and 906 do not specifically address levels of financial 
reporting quality, it is likely that management would respond to these provisions differently 
based on whether the firm had relatively aggressive earnings management pre-SOX as compared 
to a firm with relatively low earnings management pre-SOX.  I hypothesize that the additional 
responsibilities and legal penalties associated with these Sections will motivate management of 
firms that had more aggressive earnings management pre-SOX to reduce earnings management.  
However, it is an empirical question as to whether these provisions differentially affect firms 
with different levels of earnings management pre-SOX.  This leads to my fourth hypothesis 
(expressed in alternate form): 
H4a:   For firms with aggressive earnings management pre-SOX, there will be a decline 
in the absolute value of performance –adjusted abnormal accruals for each of the 
four quarters post-SOX Sections 302 and 906 (2003) as compared to the 
respective same-quarter pre-SOX Sections 302 and 906 (2001) (i.e., company 





Similar to the argument above, for companies with aggressive earnings management pre-
SOX, I also expect a decrease for each of the two subsets of companies: those that had positive 
(income increasing) abnormal accruals and those that had negative (income decreasing) 
abnormal accruals in the pre-SOX period as compared to the post-SOX period.  This leads to my 
fifth and sixth hypotheses (expressed in alternate form): 
H5a: For firms with aggressive earnings management and positive abnormal accruals 
(performance-adjusted) pre-SOX Sections 302 and 906, there will be a decline in 
the value of abnormal accruals for each of the four quarters post-SOX Sections 
302 and 906 (2003) as compared to the respective same-quarter pre-SOX Sections 
302 and 906 (2001) (i.e., company abnormal accruals will become closer to zero). 
 
H6a: For firms with aggressive earnings management and negative abnormal accruals 
(performance-adjusted) pre-SOX Sections 302 and 906, there will be a decline in 
the value of abnormal accruals for each of the four quarters post-SOX Sections 
302 and 906 (2003) as compared to the respective same-quarter pre-SOX Sections 
302 and 906 (2001) (i.e., company abnormal accruals will become closer to zero). 
 
For all of my samples, I expect the interim quarter results (Q1, Q2 and Q3) to indicate the 
change in reporting quality due primarily to the managers’ effect on financial reporting quality 
because, as stated previously, the auditor’s role in quarterly financial reporting did not directly 
change during the test period.  However, I expect the Q4 results to indicate the change in 
reporting quality due to both the managers’ effect and the auditor’s effect on financial reporting 
quality as both parties play a part in the reporting quality for the fourth quarter results.  The 
comparison of the interim quarter results and the fourth quarter results should provide 
information about the relative change in reporting quality attributable to both managers and 





III.  Research Design 
Data 
The provisions of SOX that I am interested in testing apply to all U.S. publicly traded 
companies with December 31
st
 year ends and available data on Compustat quarterly industrial 
files in order to calculate discretionary accruals for the four quarters of 2001 and the four 
quarters of 2003.
20
  This restriction likely introduces survivorship bias into the sample resulting 
in the inclusion of a higher number of larger and more stable companies.  I expect that this bias 
would cause me to be less likely to find results, thereby creating a more conservative test of my 
research question.   
Consistent with DeFond and Park (2001), I calculate accruals using all firms on 
Compustat with the same two-digit SIC code, where each SIC group has at least 20 observations 
and at least five firms with negative operating cash flow.  Consistent with Ball and Shivakumar 
(2006), I eliminate influential observations by winsorizing the extreme 0.5% of the observations 
for each variable for each quarter.
21
  Consistent with Matsumoto (2002), I exclude financial and 
insurance institutions (SIC codes 6,000 – 6,499), utility companies (SIC codes 4,800 – 4,999) 
and other quasi-regulated industries (SIC codes 4,000 – 4,499, and 8,000 and higher).  Consistent 
with Hribar and Collins (2002), I use accruals and cash flows data from the Statement of Cash 
Flows rather than estimating the variables indirectly from balance sheet data.   
  
                                                 
20 I will exclude ADRs from this analysis to focus on U.S. companies. 




Selection of Earnings Management Model 
Researchers have used many different models to estimate earnings management using 
abnormal accruals.  Dechow et al. (1995) evaluate several different earnings management models 
in order to determine which model is the most effective at differentiating ―abnormal‖ accruals 
from ―normal‖ accruals.  Their results indicate that the Modified Jones Model is best at 
identifying abnormal accruals; this model is the original Jones (1991) model as modified by 
Dechow et al. (1995).  The Modified Jones Model assumes that the change in revenue less the 
change in accounts receivable is free from managerial discretion; only credit sales are 
discretionary.
22
     
More recently, Ball and Shivakumar (2006) evaluate the usefulness of nonlinear models 
in estimating abnormal accruals.  Their results indicate that conventional linear models of 
abnormal accruals are poorly specified, suffer from attenuation bias, and explain substantially 
less of the variation in accruals as compared to models that include a nonlinear specification.  
Overall, their results show that for the industry-specific regressions using the Jones Model, the 
addition of the nonlinear term increases the R
2
 from 12% to approximately 30%, a 150% 
increase.
23
   
Kothari et al. (2005) evaluate the ability of performance-matching to improve the 
specification and power of the existing discretionary accrual models.  Their results indicate that 
discretionary accruals estimated using the Jones or Modified Jones Models, and adjusted for 
performance-matching on ROAt, tend to be the best specified measures of discretionary accruals 
                                                 
22 The original Jones model did not include the change in accounts receivable term.   
23 A few recent research papers also use this non-linear specification of the Modified Jones model (Ashbaugh-Skaife 




across a wide variety of simulated event conditions.  The authors do admit that performance-
matching may not be best in all settings.  Specifically, they conclude that a performance-matched 
discretionary accrual measure is useful in mitigating type 1 error when the partitioning variable 
in the study is correlated with performance.   
Recently, Hribar and Nichols (2007) examine the implications of using the absolute value 
of discretionary accruals when testing for earnings management.  Their results indicate that, 
when using the absolute-value of abnormal accruals as a measure of earnings management, lack 
of fit can bias tests in favor of rejecting the null hypothesis of no earnings management when the 
partitioning variable is correlated with firm characteristics such as size and volatility.  These 
authors suggest that controlling for operating volatility and size variables in the second stage of 
the discretionary accrual modeling will minimize the possibility of falsely rejecting the null 
hypothesis of no earnings management
24
.  The lack of fit these authors describe should not affect 
my study for two reasons.  First, my partitioning variable (SOX) should not be correlated with 
operating volatility or size.  Second, I examine not only the decline in the absolute-value of 
abnormal accruals (Hypothesis 1 and 4) but I also separately examine whether abnormal accruals 
decline (approach zero) for companies with positive abnormal accruals and companies with 
negative abnormal accruals (Hypotheses 2, 3, 5 and 6).   
Based on the above literature, I evaluate quarterly financial reporting quality measuring 
the absolute value of performance-adjusted abnormal accruals (and separately measuring positive 
                                                 
24 Hribar and Nichols include the five-year standard deviation of CFO, the five-year standard deviation of revenues, 




and negative abnormal accruals) using the Ball and Shivakumar nonlinear specification of the 
Modified Jones model. 
To calculate the absolute value of performance-adjusted abnormal accruals using this 
model, I first estimate the expected (non-discretionary) accruals for each firm i in industry j for 





































654  (1) 
where: 
TAccijt =   total accruals for firm i in industry j in quarter t;  
ΔSalesijt =   the quarterly change in net sales [change in Compustat item #2] for firm i 
in industry j in quarter t (versus quarter t-1); 
ΔARijt =   the quarterly change in accounts receivable [Compustat item #103] for 
firm i in industry j in quarter t (versus quarter t-1); 
PPEijt =   gross property, plant and equipment [Compustat item #118] for firm i in 
industry j in quarter t; 
CFOijt  =   quarterly cash flow from operations from the Statement of Cash Flows 
(Compustat item # 108) for firm i in industry j in quarter t; 
DCFOijt =   a binary variable which is 1 if operating cash flow is less than zero for 
firm i in industry j in quarter t; 
LagTAijt  =   beginning of the quarter total assets (Compustat item # 44) for firm i in 
industry j in quarter t-1. 
 
Consistent with previous research, total accruals is calculated as earnings from continuing 
operations minus cash flow from continuing operations [Compustat item #76 – (Compustat item 
#108- Compustat item # 78)] (Bradshaw et al. 2001; Healy 1985; Healy and Palepu 2001; 




are used to control for the expected portion of total accruals.  I also control for cash flow from 
operations and the nonlinear specification identified by Ball and Shivakumar (2006).
25
 
When estimating the ―normal‖ accruals, some researchers include an intercept term and 
some do not.  Similar to Kothari et al. (2005), I include an intercept term in the estimation to 
provide an additional control for heteroskedasticity which is not entirely eliminated by using 
lagged total assets as a deflator, and it also mitigates problems from omitting a size (or other 
scale) variable.  
Next, I use the industry-quarter-specific parameters from equation (1) above to estimate 










































   (2) 
 
Next, as explained by Kothari et al. (2005), I rank each firm into industry group deciles 
based on their prior year’s return on assets (ROA).  Within each industry group, I then calculate 
the median abnormal accruals.  Last, I calculate performance-adjusted abnormal accruals 
(PAAC) by taking the difference between the sample firm’s abnormal accruals and the median 
abnormal accruals for the industry group.  (The median ROA value excludes the specific sample 
firm.) 
                                                 
25 Consistent with the intent of the Modified Jones model, I do not scale the intercept by average total assets (Ball 




Empirical Model  
I use the following regression to test the relation between quarterly abnormal accruals 
and Sections 302 and 906:  
ABSPAACit  =  α0 + β1SOXit + β2Sizeit + β3BIGNit + β4CFOit + β5Distressit + 
β6MTBit + β7Leverageit + ε  
 
where: 
ABSPAACit =   absolute value of performance-adjusted discretionary accruals 
calculated using the Ball and Shivakumar (2006) piecewise adjustment 
to the Modified Jones Model (PAAC) for firm i in quarter t; 
SOXit  =   1 if the quarterly financial statement is for a quarter in 2003, 0 
otherwise; 
Sizeit   =   natural log of the market value of equity for firm i at the end of the 




BIGNit  = 1 if firm i  is audited by a Big N firm in quarter t, 0 otherwise;
27
 
CFOit  =   firm i’s quarterly cash flow from operations from the Statement of 
Cash Flows in quarter t (Compustat item # 108) scaled by beginning of 
the quarter total assets (Compustat item # 44 in quarter t-1); 
Distressit   =   Zmijewski’s (1984) financial condition index for firm i in quarter t; 
MTBit  =   market value of firm i  divided by the book value of assets measured at 
the beginning of the quarter t;
28
 
Leverageit  =   total debt [Compustat item # 45 (short term debt) + Compustat item # 
51 (long term debt)] divided by total assets (Compustat item # 44) for 
firm i in quarter t. 
 
Consistent with prior studies (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2008; Klein 2002), I use the 
absolute value of performance-adjusted abnormal accruals as my dependent variable, as I am 
                                                 
26 I also modeled the size variable with the natural log of total assets with (untabulated) similar results with two 
exceptions: (1) for the aggressive earnings management sample in the quarter 3, positive abnormal accruals 
subsample the test variable (SOX) was significant at the 10% level (one-tailed); and (2) for the aggressive earnings 
management sample in the quarter 2, positive abnormal accruals subsample the test variable (SOX) was significant 
at the 5% level (one-tailed). 
27 I exclude from my sample firms that were audited by Andersen pre-SOX and firms that changed auditor during 
the test period as previous research has indicated that these variables are significant in abnormal accruals modeling.   




primarily interested in determining whether abnormal accruals are moving closer to zero.
29
  For 
this same reason, I separately examine the change in abnormal accruals for companies with 
positive (negative) abnormal accruals in the pre-Section 302 and 906 timeframe.  I expect that 
the absolute value of abnormal accruals will decline following the implementation of Sections 
302 and 906, therefore, I expect a negative relation between ABSPAAC and my test variable 
(SOX). 
Control Variables   
I control for factors that previous research has indicated are significant in determining the 
magnitude of abnormal accruals.  Specifically, I control for certain company characteristics: size, 
Big N auditor, operating cash flow, financial distress, growth (proxied using the market-to-book 
ratio), and leverage.  Based on previous research, I expect a negative relation between abnormal 
accruals and size (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2008; Bédard 2006; Klein 2002), Big N auditor 
(Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2008; Becker et al. 1998; DeAngelo 1981; Francis et al. 1999; Ge and 
McVay 2005), operating cash flow (Bédard 2006; Ge and McVay 2005; Reynolds and Francis 
2000), and leverage (Francis et al. 2005; Klein 2002; Reynolds and Francis 2000) and a positive 
relation between abnormal accruals and financial distress (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2008; 
Reynolds and Francis 2000) and growth (market-to-book)
 30
 (Francis et al. 2005; Klein 2002). 
For the extreme earnings management models, I identified the 20% of the sample firms 
with the highest positive performance-adjusted abnormal accruals (calculated as detailed above) 
                                                 
29 For my study, quarterly financial reporting quality would not have improved if abnormal accruals before Section 
302 and 906 were at a mean of negative three and after Sections 302 and 906 were at a mean of positive three. 
30 I also modeled the growth variable with Tobin’s Q.  In this model, the Tobin’s Q variable was significantly 
positive approximately half of the time, however the SOX test variable results were similar to the primary model 
with one exception: for the aggressive earnings management sample in the quarter 3, positive abnormal accruals 




and the 20% of the sample firms with the highest negative performance-adjusted abnormal 
accruals as the extreme earnings management sample.  The remaining 60% of the sample firms 
are identified as the low earnings management sample.  The empirical model is the same as 
above and is calculated separately for the extreme earnings management and low earnings 
management samples. 
My model includes two observations for each company: the pre-Section 302 and 906 
period and the post-Section 302 and 906 period.  Because having multiple observations from one 
company can result in serial correlation of the error terms, I use robust standard errors in my 






IV.  Results 
Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Tests – Full Sample 
Table 1
31
 presents the sample firm composition and the number of unique firms in the 
sample.  Overall, my analysis includes 1,210 unique firms with 8,596 firm quarters.    
Table 2 presents the two-digit SIC code for the 8,596 firm-quarter observations in total 
and by pre-SOX aggressive earnings management behavior. 
In Table 3, the univariate test of differences in means for the full sample shows that the 
pre-SOX and post-SOX quarters (2001 and 2003, respectively) are statistically different in the 
absolute value of abnormal accruals (ABSPAAC) only for quarter 4, where the abnormal 
accruals are smaller post-SOX.  Company size (Size) is statistically different for all four quarters 
however size is significantly smaller post-SOX for quarters 1 and 2 and is significantly larger in 
quarters 3 and 4.  Cash flow from operations (CFO) is significantly smaller post-SOX but only in 
quarter 1.  Financial distress (Distress) and Leverage are both significantly larger post-SOX in all 
four quarters.  Market to book (MTB) is statistically different for all four quarters however 
market to book is significantly smaller post-SOX for quarters 1 and 2 and is significantly larger 
in quarters 3 and 4.  In all four quarters, the proportion of firms with a Big 4 auditor is not 
significantly different pre-SOX and post-SOX.  This is not surprising as my sample only 
includes firms that did not change auditors during the sample period.   
Because of these statistically significant differences between the pre-SOX and post-SOX 
periods, it seems appropriate to control for these variables in my multivariate tests.   
 
                                                 




Multivariate Analysis – Full Sample 
In a multivariate analysis, I examine whether quarterly financial reporting quality 
(proxied by the absolute value of abnormal accruals) has improved following SOX Sections 302 
and 906 while controlling for those variables previous research has shown to have an 
independent effect on abnormal accruals.  The multivariate results for the full sample are in 
Table 4.  For each quarter, the model (for the full sample, the positive sample and the negative 
sample) is highly significant (p<0.001), and the adjusted R-squared values are 25.7% to 37.0% 
for the full sample, 18.4% to 49.0% for the positive sample, and 32.8% to 35.1% for the negative 
sample across the four quarters.   
In quarter 1, as expected, the absolute value of abnormal accruals is lower post-SOX for 
the full sample, the sample of firms that had positive (income increasing) abnormal accruals in 
the pre-SOX period, and the sample of firms that had negative (income decreasing) abnormal 
accruals in the pre-SOX period.  The adjusted R-squared values are 25.7%, 18.4% and 32.8% for 
the full, positive and negative samples, respectively.  In all three samples, most of the control 
variables were significant in the expected direction except for the market to book and size 
variables, which were not significant.   
In quarter 2, the absolute value of abnormal accruals is not statistically different post-
SOX for the full sample and the negative abnormal accrual sample.  For the positive abnormal 
accruals sample, the absolute value of abnormal accruals is statistically larger post-SOX.  This 
result is contrary to my expectation.  The adjusted R-squared values are 26.6%, 31.1% and 




control variables were significant in the expected direction, except for the market to book and 
size variables, which were not significant. 
In quarter 3, the absolute value of abnormal accruals is not statistically different post-
SOX for the full sample and the negative abnormal accrual sample.  For the positive abnormal 
accruals sample, the absolute value of abnormal accruals is statistically larger post-SOX.  Similar 
to quarter 2 results, this result is contrary to my expectation.  The adjusted R-squared values are 
37.0%, 49.0 and 33.0% for the full, positive and negative samples, respectively.  In all three 
samples, most of the control variables were significant in the expected direction, except for the 
market to book variable, which was not significant. 
In quarter 4, the absolute value of abnormal accruals is lower post-SOX for the full 
sample and the sample of firms that had negative abnormal accruals in the pre-SOX period.  For 
the positive abnormal accruals sample, the absolute value of abnormal accruals is not 
significantly different post-SOX.  The adjusted R-squared values are 32.5%, 36.6% and 35.1% 
for the full, positive and negative samples, respectively.  In all three samples, most of the control 
variables were significant in the expected direction, except for the market to book variable, 
which was mostly not significant. 
Regarding Hypothesis 1, the results indicate that in quarters 1 and 4, the absolute value of 
abnormal accruals for the full sample are lower post-SOX, while there is no significant change in 
the absolute value of abnormal accruals in quarters 2 and 3.  Overall, the data do not appear to 
support Hypothesis 1. 
Regarding Hypothesis 2, the results indicate that in quarter 1, the absolute value of 




quarters 2 and 3, the absolute value of abnormal accruals for the positive sample are higher post-
SOX, and there is no significant change in the absolute value of abnormal accruals in quarter 4.  
Overall, the data do not appear to support Hypothesis 2. 
Regarding Hypothesis 3, the results indicate that, as expected, in quarters 1 and 4, the 
absolute value of abnormal accruals for the negative sample are lower post-SOX while there is 
no significant change in the absolute value of abnormal accruals in quarters 2 and 3.  Overall, the 
data do not appear to support Hypothesis 3. 
Overall, the results from the full sample model indicate that quarterly financial reporting 
quality (proxied by the absolute value of abnormal accruals) has not systematically improved 
following SOX.   
Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Tests – Aggressive Earnings Management Subsample 
In Table 5, the univariate test of differences in means for the aggressive earnings 
management subsample shows that the absolute value of abnormal accruals (ABSPAAC) for the 
40% of firms from the full sample with extreme earnings management is statistically larger than 
the low earnings management subsample for all four quarters.  Company size (Size), Big 4 
auditor (BIGN), and cash flow from operations (CFO) are all statistically smaller for firms in the 
aggressive earnings management subsample for all four quarters.  Financial distress (Distress) 
and Leverage are statistically larger for firms in the aggressive earnings management subsample 
for all four quarters.  The market to book (MTB) variable is statistically larger for firms in the 
aggressive earnings management subsample, but only for quarter 4; the difference between the 




In Table 6, the univariate test of differences in means pre-SOX versus post-SOX for the 
aggressive earnings management subsample shows that: the absolute value of abnormal accruals 
(ABSPAAC) is statistically smaller post-SOX for all four quarters; company size (Size) is 
statistically smaller post-SOX (except for quarter 3 when it is larger);  Financial distress 
(Distress) and Leverage are statistically larger for all four quarters; the market to book (MTB) 
variable is statistically smaller in quarters 1 and 2 and significantly larger in quarters 3 and 4; 
cash flow from operations (CFO) is not statistically different in any quarter.   
Again, in Table 6, the univariate test of differences in means pre-SOX versus post-SOX 
for the low earnings management subsample shows that: the absolute value of abnormal accruals 
(ABSPAAC) is statistically larger post-SOX for all four quarters; cash flow from operations 
(CFO) is statistically smaller post-SOX for all four quarters;  Financial distress (Distress) and 
Leverage are statistically larger in quarters 1 and 2 and are not statistically different in quarters 3 
and 4; the market to book (MTB) variable is statistically larger in quarters 3 and 4 and not 
statistically different in quarters 1 and 2; company size (Size) is significantly smaller in quarter 
1, larger in quarter 4 and not different in quarters 2 and 3. 
These results support modeling abnormal accruals separately for extreme earnings 
management firms and low earnings management firms.   
Multivariate Analysis – Aggressive Earnings Management Subsample 
In a multivariate analysis, I examine whether quarterly financial reporting quality 
(proxied by the absolute value of abnormal accruals) has improved following SOX Sections 302 
and 906 for firms with aggressive earnings management and low earnings management, 




independent effect on abnormal accruals.  The results are in Table 7.  Overall, consistent with my 
expectations, abnormal accruals decrease post SOX for the aggressive earnings management full 
sample, the positive subsample and the negative subsample.  These results are consistent for all 
four quarters, except the quarter 3 positive abnormal accruals subset of the extreme earnings 
management sample where there is no significant difference in abnormal accruals post-SOX.  
Surprisingly, for the low earnings management sample, abnormal accruals increased post-SOX 
for the full sample, the positive subsample and the negative subsample.  These results were also 
consistent for all four quarters.  For each quarter, the model (for the full sample, the positive 
subsample and the negative subsample) is highly significant (p<0.001), and the adjusted R-
squared values are 13.8% to 39.3% for the full sample, 18.1% to 52.2% for the positive 
subsample, and 12.9% to 38.8% for the negative subsample across the four quarters.   
In quarter 1, as expected, abnormal accruals decreases post SOX for the aggressive 
earnings management full sample, the positive subsample and the negative subsample.  
Surprisingly, for the low earnings management sample, abnormal accruals increased post-SOX 
for the full sample, the positive subsample and the negative subsample.   In all three samples, 
most of the control variables are significant in the expected direction except for the market to 
book and size variables, which are not significant.  The BIGN auditor variable is significantly 
negative in three of the models and not significant in the other three models.  The financial 
distress (Distress) and leverage variables are significant in the expected direction, except for the 
aggressive abnormal accruals positive abnormal accruals subsample where the variables are both 




Similar to quarter 1, in quarter 2, abnormal accruals decrease post SOX for the aggressive 
earnings management full sample, the positive subsample and the negative subsample.  
Surprisingly, for the low earnings management sample, abnormal accruals increased post-SOX 
for the full sample, the positive subsample and the negative subsample.   In all three samples, 
most of the control variables are significant in the expected direction except for the market to 
book variable, which is not significant.  The size and BIGN auditor variables are significantly 
significant in the expected direction, but only in two models.  In the other four models, the 
variables are not significant.  The financial distress (Distress), leverage, and cash flow from 
operations variables are significant in the expected direction but only in three or four of the 
models.  In the other models, these variables are not significant.   
Again in quarter 3, as expected, abnormal accruals decrease post SOX for the aggressive 
earnings management full sample and the negative subsample, however, for the low earnings 
management sample, abnormal accruals increase post-SOX for the full sample, the positive 
subsample and the negative subsample.   In quarter 3, the change in abnormal accruals for the 
positive subsample of the extreme earnings management sample is not significant different from 
zero.  In all three samples, only the cash flow from operations variable is significant in the 
expected direction.   The BIGN auditor variable was significantly negative in four of the models 
and not significant in the other two models.  The size variable is significant in the expected 
direction in two models and not significant in the remaining four models.   The financial distress 
(Distress) and leverage variables are significant in the expected direction for three models, 




In quarter 4, as expected, abnormal accruals decreases post SOX for the aggressive 
earnings management full sample, the positive subsample and the negative subsample.  Again, 
for the low earnings management sample, abnormal accruals increase post-SOX for the full 
sample, the positive subsample and the negative subsample.   In all three samples, the cash flow 
from operations variable is significant in the expected direction.  The size variable is significant 
in the expected direction for four models and not significant in the other two models.  The Big 4 
auditor variable is significant in two of the models and not significant in the other four models.  
The market to book variable is significant in the opposite direction for two of the models and not 
significant in the other four models.  The financial distress (Distress) and leverage variables are 
significant in the expected direction for two models and not significant in the other four models.     
Regarding Hypothesis 4, the results indicate that for firms with aggressive earnings 
management pre-SOX, there is a decline in the absolute value of performance–adjusted abnormal 
accruals for each of the four quarters post-SOX as compared to the respective same-quarter pre-
SOX.   
Regarding Hypothesis 5, the results indicate that for firms with aggressive earnings 
management and positive abnormal accruals (performance-adjusted) pre-SOX Sections 302 and 
906, there is a decline in the absolute value of abnormal accruals in quarters 1, 2 and 4 post-SOX 
as compared to the respective same-quarter pre-SOX.  There is no significant change in 
abnormal accruals in quarter 3.   
Regarding Hypothesis 6, the results indicate that for firms with aggressive earnings 




906, there is a decline in the value of abnormal accruals for each of the four quarters post-SOX 
as compared to the respective same-quarter pre-SOX. 
Interestingly, for all three samples and for all four quarters, firms in the low earnings 
management sample increase abnormal accruals post-SOX.   
Overall, the results indicate that SOX 302 and 906 are associated with lower earnings 
management for the firms that exhibit the most aggressive earnings management pre-SOX, and 
are associated with higher earnings management for the firms that exhibit the lowest earnings 






V.  Additional Analyses 
In addition to my main analysis above, I performed several additional sensitivity 
analyses.  First, to further strengthen my contribution regarding the financial reporting quality 
attributed to managers versus the ―joint measure‖ of financial reporting quality, I compare the 
abnormal accruals from Q2 of 2002 to Q3 of 2002, the last quarter before and the first quarter 
after the implementation of Sections 302 and 906.  This period is the most likely to have 
experienced a change in financial reporting quality that can be attributed primarily to 
management versus both management and the auditors.  However, as Figure 1
32
 indicates, 
performance-adjusted abnormal accruals have a quarterly pattern that makes a quarter 3 to 
quarter 4 analysis problematic.  In Figure 1, I plot the signed quarterly performance-adjusted 
abnormal accruals from 2000 to 2006 in total and separately for the positive and negative 
abnormal accruals subsamples (positive and negative abnormal accruals were calculated for each 
year separately in this graph).
33
   
From Figure 1, it is apparent that the performance-adjusted abnormal accruals increase in 
each quarter from quarter 1 to quarter 4 and then decline in quarter 1 of the next year.  For this 
reason, a levels comparison of quarter 2 to quarter 3 of 2002 would not be appropriate.  Instead, I 
compared the average change in performance-adjusted abnormal accruals from Q2 to Q3 of 2001 
to the average change in performance-adjusted abnormal accruals from Q2 to Q3 of 2002.  My 
                                                 
32 Graph 1 appears in Appendix 4. 
33 It is not relevant to my study to look at quarterly financial reports before 2000 because for fiscal quarters ending 
on or after March 15, 2000, the SEC required that registrants have contemporaneous reviews (by auditors) of 
quarterly financial reports.  Prior to that, registrants could choose contemporaneous or retrospective reviews of 
quarterly reports and disclosure of the choice was not necessary.  This change in 2000 would affect the ability of this 
study to contribute to the literature regarding managements’ effect on financial reporting quality separate from the 




results indicate that performance-adjusted abnormal accruals are larger in Q3 than Q2 in both 
2001 and 2002.  However, in 2002, the average change in performance-adjusted abnormal 
accruals from Q2 to Q3 is smaller than the related change in 2001.  This would indicate that 
SOX Sections 302 and 906 had a dampening effect on performance-adjusted abnormal accruals.    
Second, while SOX 302 and 906 did not directly affect auditor responsibility for the 
quarterly financial reports, in light of the well-published corporate frauds and Andersen troubles, 
it might be true that auditor behavior related to quarterly financial reporting had changed 
(separate from SOX) resulting in improved financial reporting quality in quarter 2 of 2002 (pre-
SOX).  In order to provide some evidence that auditor behavior had not changed on a quarterly 
basis pre-SOX, I compared performance adjusted abnormal accruals (controlling for all of the 
variables in the primary model) between quarter 2 of 2000, 2001 and 2002.  For firms with 
aggressive earnings management in quarter 2 of 2001, abnormal accruals increased significantly 
from 2000 to 2001 and did not change from 2001 to 2002.  For firms with low earnings 
management in quarter 2 of 2001, abnormal accruals increased significantly from 2000 to 2001 
and decreased significantly from 2001 to 2002; the overall change from 2000 to 2002 was not 
significant.  These results do not indicate that abnormal accruals pre-SOX (quarter 2 of 2002) 
were systematically improved as a result of increased auditor involvement in quarterly financial 
reporting.   
Third, existing literature has indicated a relation between improvements in corporate 
governance and earnings quality (Bédard et al. 2004; Braiotta and Zhou 2006; Carcello et al. 
2006; Carcello and Neal 2000; Carcello and Neal 2003; Klein 2002; Lin et al. 2006).  However, 




my sample has 1,210 unique firms and 8,596 individual firm quarters, hand collecting 
governance variables is not reasonable (other studies with large sample sizes have examined 
earnings management for large samples without hand collecting these variables (Ashbaugh-
Skaife et al. 2008; Cohen et al. 2008; Doyle et al. 2007; Francis et al. 2005; Lobo and Zhou 
2006).  Using the available databases, I was able to download three common governance 
variables from the Risk Metrics Database
34
: the boss variable,
35
 the percent of outsiders sitting 
on the Board of Directors, and the percent of outsiders sitting on the Audit Committee of the 
Board of Directors.  However, after merging the firms with available Compustat data to calculate 
my model and the firms with available governance data, there were only 204 unique firms with 
1,474 individual firm quarters on which to run the model.  As a result, the models were not 
significant in almost all of the cases.
36
  Therefore, the question as to whether a firm’s corporate 
governance characteristics are associated with quarterly earnings management in the post-SOX 
environment is a topic for another study.   
Fourth, in an environment that continues to debate the implementation of SOX Section 
404 for non-accelerated filers, I examine the results of my tests separately for accelerated filers 
and non-accelerated filers. My results (untabulated) provide evidence of improved financial 
reporting quality for non-accelerated filers following Sections 302 and 906.  Specifically, my 
results indicate that aggressive earnings management for non-accelerated filers decreased in all 
four quarters while aggressive earnings management for accelerated filers only decreased in 
                                                 
34 Provided through ISS Governance Services and previously known as IRRC. 
35 The variable is usually a binary variable equal to 1 if the CEO and Chairman of the Board are the same individual 
and 0 otherwise. 
36 It should be noted that all 204 of these firms had a 100% independent Audit Committee; 67% of the observations 
had the same individual as the CEO and Chairman, and more than 75% of the observations had a Board of Directors 




quarters 3 and 4.  These results provide some indication that non-accelerated filers improve 
financial reporting quality following the implementation of SOX 302 and 906, even though 
Section 404 is not relevant for these firms. 
Fifth, to rule out the possibility that my results are attributable to the PCAOB limited 
inspections, rather than Sections 302 and 906, I tested for a greater improvement in quarterly 
financial statement quality in the Q3 and Q4 analyses than in the Q1 and Q2 analyses, only for 
clients of the largest 4 accounting firms.   (See Appendix 1 for more information regarding the 
PCAOB inspections.)  The results of this test (untabulated) were very similar to my main model 
results.  There is no indication that the PCAOB limited inspections are driving my main model 
results. 
Sixth, my sample includes two observations for each company, introducing serial 
correlation of the error terms.  To address this issue, I also run a panel data fixed effects model. 
My results, in Table 8, are very similar to my primary model results except in one case where my 
test variable was no longer significant.  In the panel data model, for firms with aggressive 
earnings management, the positive abnormal accruals subsample in quarter 3 is no longer 
significant using a panel data model.  This difference does not materially change the 
interpretation of the results of the primary model.   
Seventh, in order to test the sensitivity of my results to the model selected, I also 
calculate abnormal accruals using the Jones (1991) model and the modified Jones model 
(Dechow et al. 1995).  The Jones (1991) model results (untabulated) were very similar to the 
performance-adjusted abnormal accruals used in my primary analysis.  The modified Jones 




aggressive earnings management sample of firms with negative abnormal accruals where the 
results for quarters 2 and 3 are no longer significant.  This indicates that my results are not 
primarily driven by my model selection.   
Eighth, examining abnormal accruals is only one measure of financial reporting quality.  
In order to provide additional evidence regarding quarterly financial reporting quality 
surrounding the implementation of SOX 302 and 906, I also examined the likelihood of 
companies to meet or just beat their quarterly earnings forecasts before and after SOX 302 and 
906.  Previous literature has indicated that the ability of a company to just meet or beat their 
earnings estimates is a sign of earnings management (or expectations management) and is 
therefore is sign of lower financial reporting quality(Cotter et al. 2006; Matsumoto 2002; 
Richardson et al. 2004).  Previous research has also shown that firms have capital market 
incentives to achieve earnings forecasts (Bartov et al. 2002; Brown and Pinello 2008; Skinner 
and Sloan 2002).  Based on this literature, I would expect that firms would be less likely to just 
meet or beat their quarterly earnings forecasts after the implementation of SOX 302 and 906.   
Specifically, I use a logistic regression model to evaluate the likelihood that a firm would 
just meet or beat their quarterly earnings forecast before and after SOX 302 and 906.
37
  My test 
model is as follows: 
  
                                                 




MBEit  =  α0 + β1SOXit + β2Lossit + β3Sizeit + β4Growthit + ε  
 
where: 
MBEit  =   is a binary variable that equals 1 if the firm either met or just beat (by 
$0.01) their quarterly earnings forecast for firm i in quarter t, 0 
otherwise (earnings forecasts are from the IBES database); 
SOXit  =   is a binary variable that equals 1 if the quarterly financial statement is 
for a quarter in 2003, 0 otherwise; 
Lossit  =   is a binary variable that equals 1 if the firm reports a loss for firm i in 
quarter t, 0 otherwise; 
Sizeit   =   natural log of the market value of equity for firm i at the end of the 
quarter (t-1); 
Growthit   =   natural log of the market to book ratio for firm i at the end of the 
quarter (t-1); 
 
I use this model to evaluate the proclivity of a firm to just meet or beat their quarterly 
earnings forecasts for three samples of firms: (1) all firms with the necessary data in IBES and 
Compustat to calculate this model (10,088 firm-quarters), (2) the same set of firms that were 
included in my primary earnings management model
38
  and with the necessary information 
available in IBES (3,156 firm-quarters), and (3) the set of firms in group (2) above examined 
separately for extreme and low earnings management firms.  The results (untabulated) for the 
first two groups of firms above, the full set of firms with IBES information available and the set 
of firms that were included in my earnings management sample (and with the necessary IBES 
information available) are similar: firms are less likely to just meet or beat their quarterly 
earnings forecasts in quarters 2, 3 and 4 for both groups.  For both groups, there is no difference 
in the likelihood to just meet or beat their quarterly earnings forecasts in quarter 1.  Similar to the 
results from my primary analysis above, these results provide some indication that firms have 
improved financial quarterly reporting quality following the implementation of SOX Sections 
                                                 




302 and 906.  The statistical models for the extreme and low earnings management samples were 
not significant in almost all cases.
39
   
  
                                                 
39 The model was only significant for the low earnings management subsample and only in quarters 2 and 4.  In 
these two models, the coefficient on the test variable (SOX) is significant and negative, indicating that firms with 
low earnings management in quarters 2 and 4 have a lower likelihood of just meeting or beating their earnings 




VI.  Summary, Implications and Limitations 
This study examines whether the provisions of SOX Sections 302 and 906 are associated 
with improved financial reporting quality.  These provisions of SOX require the management of 
public companies to personally certify the financial statements, including the effectiveness of 
internal controls over financial reporting and any material changes in internal control, and they 
impose severe criminal penalties for false management certifications made knowingly or 
willfully.  Congress clearly intends that these new requirements and penalties would result in 
improved financial reporting.  
In this paper, I offer some evidence that this goal was met in the year following the 
implementation of SOX 302 and 906.  The results indicate that financial reporting quality 
(proxied by the absolute value of performance-adjusted abnormal accruals) improves following 
the implementation of SOX Sections 302 and 906 for firms exhibiting aggressive earnings 
management behavior in the pre-SOX period.  Interestingly, firms exhibiting low earnings 
management in the pre-SOX period have higher abnormal accruals (and lower earnings quality) 
in the post-SOX period.  These results were consistent across all four quarters and for the total 
sample, the subsample with positive (income increasing) abnormal accruals, and the subsample 
with negative (income decreasing) abnormal accruals pre-SOX, with one exception.  For quarter 
2, financial reporting quality did not change for the positive abnormal accruals subsample of the 
extreme earnings management sample.   
Because these provisions directly changed only the expectations of management related 
to quarterly filings, this study provides some evidence regarding the managers’ effect on 




quality improved in the interim quarters as well as the fourth quarter.  These results would seem 
to indicate that managers of firms that exhibited extreme earnings management behavior in the 
pre-SOX period improved quarterly financial reporting quality following SOX 302 and 906.   
A limitation of this study is the inability to isolate the effect on financial reporting quality 
of actions taken by management by their own initiative versus actions taken by management or 
by the auditor at the request of the Board of Directors or the Audit Committee.  It is possible that 
either the Board or the Audit Committee required management or the auditor to take certain 
actions or make specific changes to their normal processes during the time period of my analysis 
either as a result of SOX or the macro-environment in general.  Because I cannot observe the 
actions of the Board or Audit Committee, the result is (best case) noise in my model or (worst 
case) correlated omitted variables.  While I have tried to isolate the effects of Sections 302 and 
906 in my research design, at the very least, this study should provide useful information about 
quarterly financial reporting quality during this very interesting time.   
A second limitation of this study is that it only provides evidence of improved quarterly 
financial reporting quality in the year following the implementation of SOX.  It would be 
interesting for a future paper to examine quarterly financial reporting quality over a longer time 
horizon, providing an indication if the change in management behavior was short-term or longer-
term.    
Another limitation of this study is the use of discretionary accruals as a proxy for 
earnings management.  As with all studies that use this measure, I cannot observe earnings 




however, control for misspecification in this model using both the Kothari et al. (2005) 
performance matching and the Ball and Shivakumar (2006) nonlinear specification.   
Subject to these limitations, this study makes several contributions to the literature.  First, 
it provides evidence that quarterly financial reporting quality improves following the 
implementation of Sections 302 and 906 for firms that exhibited extreme earnings management 
behavior pre-SOX.  Second, it provides some evidence about managements’ effect on quarterly 
financial reporting quality separate from the auditor’s effect because this study indicates that 
quarterly financial reporting quality improves (there is a decrease in abnormal accruals for 
aggressive earnings management firms during my test period) for the interim quarters as well as 
for the fourth quarter. Third, it can inform the ongoing debate surrounding the implementation of 
Section 404 requirements for non-accelerated filers; non-accelerated filers exhibiting aggressive 
earnings management in the pre-SOX period show improved financial reporting quality post-
SOX.  Fourth, my results provide an indication of an association between increased individual 
criminal liability and changes in manager’s behavior.  As a result of these contributions, the 
results of this study should be interesting to policy setters and regulators (SEC and PCAOB), 










Accounting Principles Board Opinion No. 28: Interim Financial Reporting. 1973. New York: 
The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants. 
Alverson, L. 2005. Sarbanes-Oxley S302 & 906: Corporate Reform or Legislative Redundancy? 
A Critical Look at the "New" Corporate Responsibility For Financial Reports. Securities 
Regulation Law Journal 33 (1):15. 
Anonymous. 1998. Chairman Levitt attacks earnings management. The CPA Journal 68 (11):8. 
Ashbaugh-Skaife, H., D. W. Collins, W. R. Kinney Jr, and R. LaFond. 2008. The Effect of SOX 
Internal Control Deficiencies and Their Remediation on Accrual Quality. The Accounting 
Review 83 (1):217-250. 
Ball, R., and L. Shivakumar. 2006. The Role of Accruals in Asymmetrically Timely Gain and 
Loss Recognition. Journal of Accounting Research 44 (2):207-242. 
Barton, J., and P. J. Simko. 2002. The Balance Sheet as an Earnings Management Constraint. 
The Accounting Review 77:1-27. 
Bartov, E., D. Givoly, and C. K. Hayn. 2002. The rewards to meeting or beating earnings 
expectations. Journal of Accounting & Economics 33 (2):173-204. 
Beaver, W. H. 1998. Financial Reporting: An Accounting Revolution. Third ed. Upper Saddle, 
NJ: Prentice Hall. 
Becker, C. L., M. L. Defond, J. Jiambalvo, and K. R. Subramanyam. 1998. The effect of audit 
quality on earnings management. Contemporary Accounting Research 15 (1):1. 
Bédard, J. 2006. Sarbanes Oxley Internal Control Requirements and Earnings Quality: SSRN. 
Bédard, J., S. M. Chtourou, and L. Courteau. 2004. The Effect of Audit Committee Expertise, 
Independence, and Activity on Aggressive Earnings Management. Auditing 23 (2):13-35. 
Bradshaw, M. T., S. A. Richardson, and R. G. Sloan. 2001. Do analysts and auditors use 
information in accruals? Journal of Accounting Research 39 (1):45-73. 
Braiotta, J., Louis, , and J. Zhou. 2006. An exploratory study of the effects of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act, the SEC and United States stock exchange(s) rules on audit committee alignment. 
Managerial Auditing Journal 21 (1/2):166-191. 
Brown, L. D., and M. L. Caylor. 2005. A Temporal Analysis of Quarterly Earnings Thresholds: 




Brown, L. D., and A. S. Pinello. 2008. An Investigation of Firms' Propensities to Meet or Miss 
Analysts' Forecasts of Cash Flows and Earnings: SSRN. 
Burgstahler, D., and M. Eames. 2006. Management of Earnings and Analysts' Forecasts to 
Achieve Zero and Small Positive Earnings Surprises. Journal of Business Finance & 
Accounting 33 (5/6):633-652. 
Carcello, J. V., C. Hollingsworth, and S. A. Mastrolia. 2008. The Effect of PCAOB Inspections 
on Big 4 Audit Quality. Working Paper. 
Carcello, J. V., C. W. Hollingsworth, and T. L. Neal. 2006. Audit Committee Financial Experts: 
A Closer Examination Using Firm Designations. Accounting Horizons 20 (4):351-374. 
Carcello, J. V., and T. L. Neal. 2000. Audit Committee Composition and Auditor Reporting. The 
Accounting Review 75 (4):453-467. 
———. 2003. Audit committee characteristics and auditor dismissals following "new" going-
concern reports. The Accounting Review 78 (1):95-117. 
Clayton, R. D., and T. Mackintosh. 2002. Corporate Governance: Avoiding Criminal Liability 
under Sarbanes-Oxley. Holland & Hart, LLP. 
Cohen, D. A., A. Dey, and T. Z. Lys. 2008. Real and Accrual-Based Earnings Management in 
the Pre- and Post-Sarbanes-Oxley Periods. The Accounting Review 83 (3):757-788. 
Cotter, J., I. Tuna, P. D. Wysocki, and J. L. Callen. 2006. Expectations Management and 
Beatable Targets: How Do Analysts React to Explicit Earnings Guidance?: Discussion of 
"Expectations Management and Beatable Targets: How Do Analysts React to Explicit 
Earnings Guidance?". Contemporary Accounting Research 23 (3):593-624. 
Cunningham, L. A. 2002. Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform (and It Just 
Might Work), The. Connecticut Law Review 35:915. 
Daniel, N. D., D. J. Denis, and L. Naveen. 2008. Do firms manage earnings to meet dividend 
thresholds? Journal of Accounting & Economics 45 (1):2-26. 
DeAngelo, L. E. 1981. Auditor Size and Audit Quality. Journal of Accounting & Economics 3 
(3):183-199. 
Dechow, P. M., S. A. Richardson, and I. Tuna. 2003. Why Are Earnings Kinky? An Examination 
of the Earnings Management Explanation. Review of Accounting Studies 8 (2):355-384. 
Dechow, P. M., R. G. Sloan, and A. P. Sweeney. 1995. Detecting earnings management. The 




DeFond, M. L., and C. W. Park. 2001. The reversal of abnormal accruals and the market 
valuation of earnings surprises. The Accounting Review 76 (3):375-405. 
Doyle, J. T., W. Ge, and S. McVay. 2007. Accruals Quality and Internal Control over Financial 
Reporting. The Accounting Review 82 (5):1141-1170. 
Fairfax, L. M. 2002. Form over Substance? Officer Certification and the Promise of Enhanced 
Personal Accountability under the Sarbanes–Oxley Act. Rutgers Law Review 55 (1). 
Federal Register. 2004. Securities and Exchange Commission, 70291. 
Francis, J., R. LaFond, P. Olsson, and K. Schipper. 2005. The market pricing of accruals quality. 
Journal of Accounting and Economics 39 (2):295. 
Francis, J. R., E. L. Maydew, and H. C. Sparks. 1999. The role of Big 6 auditors in the credible 
reporting of accruals. Auditing-A Journal Of Practice & Theory 18 (2):17-34. 
Ge, W., and S. McVay. 2005. The disclosure of material weaknesses in internal control after the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Accounting Horizons 19 (3):137-159. 
Gunny, K., and T. C. Zhang. 2006. The Association Between Earnings Quality and Regulatory 
Report Opinions in the Accounting Industry - AICPA Peer Review and PCAOB 
Inspections: SSRN. 
Hackenbrack, K., and W. R. Knechel. 1997. Resource allocation decisions in audit engagements. 
Contemporary Accounting Research 14 (3):481-500. 
Hay, D. C., W. R. Knechel, and N. Wong. 2006. Audit Fees: A Meta-analysis of the Effect of 
Supply and Demand Attributes. Contemporary Accounting Research 23 (1):141-191. 
Healy, P. M. 1985. The Effect of Bonus Schemes on Accounting Decisions. Journal of 
Accounting & Economics 7 (1-3):85-107. 
Healy, P. M., and K. G. Palepu. 2001. Information asymmetry, corporate disclosure, and the 
capital markets: A review of the empirical disclosure literature. Journal of Accounting & 
Economics 31 (1-3):405-440. 
Hribar, P., and D. W. Collins. 2002. Errors in estimating accruals: Implications for empirical 
research. Journal of Accounting Research 40 (1):105-134. 
Hribar, P., and D. C. Nichols. 2007. The Use of Unsigned Earnings Quality Measures in Tests of 




Johl, S., C. A. Jubb, and K. A. Houghton. 2007. Earnings management and the audit opinion: 
evidence from Malaysia. Managerial Auditing Journal 22 (7):688. 
Jones, J. J. 1991. Earnings Management During Import Relief Investigations. Journal of 
Accounting Research 29 (2):193-228. 
Klein, A. 2002. Audit committee, board of director characteristics, and earnings management. 
Journal of Accounting & Economics 33 (3):375-400. 
Koh, P.-S. 2007. Institutional investor type, earnings management and benchmark beaters. 
Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 26 (3):267-299. 
Kothari, S. P., A. J. Leone, and C. E. Wasley. 2005. Performance matched discretionary accrual 
measures. Journal of Accounting and Economics 39 (1):163-197. 
Levinsohn, A. 2003. Legal liability for your financial reporting? Strategic Finance 85 (3):63-64. 
Lin, J. W., J. F. Li, and J. S. Yang. 2006. The effect of audit committee performance on earnings 
quality. Managerial Auditing Journal 21 (9):921. 
Lobo, G. J., and J. Zhou. 2006. Did Conservatism in Financial Reporting Increase after the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act? Initial Evidence. Accounting Horizons 20 (1):57-73. 
Matsumoto, D. A. 2002. Management's incentives to avoid negative earnings surprises. The 
Accounting Review 77 (3):483-515. 
McEnroe, J. E. 2007. Perceptions of the Effect of Sarbanes-Oxley on Earnings Management 
Practices. Research in Accounting Regulation 19:137-157. 
Mendenhall, R. R., and W. D. Nichols. 1988. Bad News and Differential Market Reactions to 
Announcements of Earlier-Quarters Versus Fourth-Quarter Earnings. Journal of 
Accounting Research 26:63-86. 
Menon, K., and D. D. Williams. 2001. Long-term trends in audit fees. Auditing 20 (1):115-136. 
Phillips, J., M. Pincus, and S. O. Rego. 2003. Earnings management: New evidence based on 
deferred tax expense. The Accounting Review 78 (2):491-521. 
President Bush's Speech from Wall Street. 2002. July 9, 2002. 
Public Accounting Report. 1998. Levitt scolds auditors for 'managed' earnings, October 15, 4. 
Raghunandan, K., and D. V. Rama. 2006. SOX Section 404 Material Weakness Disclosures and 




Reynolds, J. K., and J. R. Francis. 2000. Does size matter? The influence of large clients on 
office-level auditor reporting decisions. Journal of Accounting & Economics 30 (3):375-
400. 
Richardson, S. A., S. H. Teoh, and P. D. Wysocki. 2004. The Walk-down to Beatable Analyst 
Forecasts: The Role of Equity Issuance and Insider Trading Incentives*. Contemporary 
Accounting Research 21 (4):885-924. 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. 107-204. 107th Congress, July 30, 2002. 
Simunic, D. A. 1980. The Pricing of Audit Services: Theory and Evidence. Journal of 
Accounting Research 18 (1):161-190. 
Skinner, D. J., and R. G. Sloan. 2002. Earnings Surprises, Growth Expectations, and Stock 
Returns or Don't Let an Earnings Torpedo Sink Your Portfolio. Review of Accounting 
Studies 7 (2):289-312. 
Statement on Auditing Standards No. 100: Interim Financial Information. 2002. New York: The 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants. 
Zmijewski, M. E. 1984. Methodological Issues Related to the Estimation of Financial Distress 



















Example of SOX Section 302 Certification of CEO (Microsoft Corporation) 
I, Steven A. Ballmer, certify that:  
1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Microsoft Corporation;  
2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a 
material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were 
made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;  
3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly 
present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, 
and for, the periods presented in this report;  
4. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls 
and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) and internal control over financial 
reporting (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(f) and 15d-15(f)) for the registrant and have:  
a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be 
designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its 
consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in 
which this report is being prepared;  
b) Designed such internal control over financial reporting, or caused such internal control over financial reporting to 
be designed under our supervision, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial reporting 
and the preparation of financial statements for external purposes in accordance with generally accepted accounting 
principles;  
c) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our 
conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by 
this report based on such evaluation; and  
d) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting that occurred 
during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) 
that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’s internal control over financial 
reporting; and  
5. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal 
control over financial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and the audit committee of registrant’s board of directors 
(or persons performing the equivalent functions):  
a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial 
reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and 
report financial information; and  
b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in 
the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting.  
January 24, 2008  
/s/    Steven A. Ballmer 
  





Example of SOX Section 302 Certification of CFO (Microsoft Corporation) 
I, Christopher P. Liddell, certify that:  
1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Microsoft Corporation;  
2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a 
material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were 
made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;  
3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly 
present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, 
and for, the periods presented in this report;  
4. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls 
and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) and internal control over financial 
reporting (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(f) and 15d-15(f)) for the registrant and have:  
a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be 
designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its 
consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in 
which this report is being prepared;  
b) Designed such internal control over financial reporting, or caused such internal control over financial reporting to 
be designed under our supervision, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial reporting 
and the preparation of financial statements for external purposes in accordance with generally accepted accounting 
principles;  
c) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our 
conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by 
this report based on such evaluation; and  
d) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting that occurred 
during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) 
that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’s internal control over financial 
reporting; and  
5. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal 
control over financial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and the audit committee of registrant’s board of directors 
(or persons performing the equivalent functions):  
a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial 
reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and 
report financial information; and  
b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in 
the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting.  
January 24, 2008  
/s/    Christopher P. Liddell 
  







Example of SOX Section 906 Certification of CEO (Microsoft Corporation) 
 
CERTIFICATIONS PURSUANT TO  
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002  
(18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350)  
In connection with the Quarterly Report of Microsoft Corporation, a Washington corporation (the ―Company‖), on 
Form 10-Q for the quarter ended December 31, 2007, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the 
―Report‖), Steven A. Ballmer, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, does hereby certify, pursuant to § 906 of 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. § 1350), that to his knowledge:  
(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934; and  
(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and 
result of operations of the Company.  
  
 
/s/    Steven A. Ballmer 
  
Steven A. Ballmer 
Chief Executive Officer 
January 24, 2008 
[A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to Microsoft Corporation and 
will be retained by Microsoft Corporation and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff 





Example of Auditor’s Review Report for Quarterly Filing (Microsoft Corporation) 
 
January 24, 2008  
Microsoft Corporation  
One Microsoft Way  
Redmond, Washington  
We have reviewed, in accordance with the standards of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (United 
States), the unaudited interim financial information of Microsoft Corporation and subsidiaries for the periods ended 
December 31, 2007 and 2006, as indicated in our report dated January 24, 2008; because we did not perform an 
audit, we expressed no opinion on that information.  
We are aware that our report referred to above, which was included in your Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the 
quarter ended December 31, 2007, is incorporated by your reference in Registration Statements Nos. 333-120511, 
333-109185, 333-06298, 333-16665, 333-118764, 333-91755, 333-52852, 333-102240, 33-36498, 33-45617 and 
333-132100 of Microsoft Corporation on Forms S-8 and Registration Statement Nos. 333-43449, 333-110107, and 
333-108843 of Microsoft Corporation on Forms S-3.  
We also are aware that the aforementioned report, pursuant to Rule 436© under the Securities Act of 1933, is not 
considered a part of the Registration Statement prepared or certified by an accountant or a report prepared or 
certified by an accountant within the meaning of Sections 7 and 11 of that Act.  
DELOITTE & TOUCHE LLP  
/s/    DELOITTE & TOUCHE LLP  













According to their mission statement, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 
(PCAOB) ―is a private-sector, non-profit corporation, created by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002, to oversee the auditors of public companies in order to protect the interests of investors 
and further the public interest in the preparation of informative, fair and independent audit 
reports.‖
40
  The creation of the PCAOB was one of the significant provisions of SOX.  The 
PCAOB sets auditing standards and oversees the auditors of public companies.  Specifically 
related to the oversight of auditors, the PCAOB ensures the registration and inspection of 
auditors of public companies.  They also have the authority to enforce their rules related to 
auditors through disciplinary hearings and the power to revoke the registration of audit firms 
who do not comply.  I am aware of two papers that are currently in progress related to the effect 
of the PCAOB inspection process on financial reporting quality.  Gunny and Zhang (2006) 
determine that the opinions from the PCAOB inspections are able to distinguish earnings quality, 
as measured by the use of discretionary accruals, the propensity to meet earnings benchmarks 
and the use of earnings smoothing techniques.  Carcello et al. (2008) examine abnormal accruals 
for all clients of each Big 4 audit firm
41
 in the first two years after a PCAOB inspection.  Their 
results indicate that there is a significant decrease in abnormal accruals in each of the two years 
following the inspection, primarily driven by clients that had positive (income increasing) 
abnormal accruals in the year before the inspection.   
                                                 
40 http://www.pcaob.com/index.aspx 





Notwithstanding this research, I do not expect the PCAOB registration, inspection and 
enforcement actions to confound the results of this study because, while the PCAOB was created 
in 2002, it did not begin registration of audit firms until October 22, 2003,
42
 the very end of my 
test period.  Inspections for all audit firms except the four largest firms
43
 did not commence until 
5/1/2004 and the first inspection report for these firms was issued 1/21/2005.  For the four largest 
audit firms, the first inspections were identified as ―limited inspections‖.  These limited 
inspections occurred in the second half of calendar 2003, and the limited inspection reports were 
issued in August of 2004.  According to the 2003 limited inspection reports for the four largest 
audit firms, the limited inspection: 
…included a review of certain portions of selected audit engagements and 
a review of policies and procedures in the following seven functional 
areas … tone at the top; practices for partner evaluation, compensation, 
promotion, and assignment of responsibility; independence implications of 
non-audit services, business ventures, alliances and arrangements, and 
commissions and contingent fees; client acceptance and retention; the 
firm’s internal inspection program; practices for establishment and 
communication of audit policies, procedures and methodologies, including 
training; and the supervision by U.S. audit engagement teams of the work 





None of these topics can be clearly identified as affecting the quarterly review process.  
Additionally, because audit fees are often used as a proxy for audit effort (Hackenbrack 
and Knechel 1997; Hay et al. 2006; Menon and Williams 2001; Simunic 1980), I calculated the 
annual average audit fee (in millions) for 2000 through 2006 for all companies in Audit 
                                                 
42 http://www.pcaob.com/Rules/Rules_of_the_Board/Section_2.pdf 
43 Deloitte & Touche LLP, Ernst & Young LLP, KPMG LLP, and PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP. 






 and determined that while average audit fees increased slightly in 2002-2003, the 
most significant increase was from 2003 to 2004, likely reflecting the additional audit effort 
related to internal control audits under Section 404 (Raghunandan and Rama 2006) and 
(potentially) from implementation of audit or risk assessment changes resulting from the PCAOB 
inspections.  There is no clear indication that auditors were billing (or performing) significant 
additional work in 2003, supporting my argument that auditors likely did not perform extensive 
additional work on the quarterly SEC filings in 2003 as compared to 2001. 
In summary, I do not expect PCAOB inspections to affect my sample because only the 
four largest firms had any PCAOB inspection activity during my test period (2001-2003), and 
even for those firms, the PCAOB only conducted limited reviews of audit engagements, not of 
quarterly reviews, from June of 2003 to December of 2003;
46
 the reports were not issued until 
August of 2004.  It is not likely that the four largest audit firms, each with 65+ offices and 
15,000+ professional employees, improved their client risk assessment procedures resulting in 
enhancements to their quarterly financial statement review process and disseminated these 
changes to the local practice offices quickly enough after the PCAOB inspections began to affect 
quarterly reporting in 2003.  Also, the PCAOB had not previously conducted inspections, so it is 
unlikely that the inspectors were able to identify and communicate quality issues related to the 
quarterly financial statement review process to the audit firm quickly enough to affect the 
September of 2003 or December of 2003 quarterly reviews.  Lastly, it is not likely that the effort 
                                                 
45 www.auditanalytics.com 




which an audit firm expended on quarterly reviews or annual audits would not be reflected in 
higher fees, which did not materialize to any great extent until 2004.   
If my conclusions above are not correct, I would expect to see a greater improvement in 
quarterly financial statement quality in the 2003 Q3 and Q4 analyses than in the Q1 and Q2 
analyses when examining only the clients of the largest 4 accounting firms.  I conduct this as a 













Sample Firms Composition 
 




US Firms with data available in Compustat to 
calculate abnormal accruals 16,690  14,859  
Drop Andersen clients (2,641) 
 Drop firms in excluded industries (3,128) (3,239) 
Drop firms without data available in Compustat 
to calculate test model (1,840) (1,695) 
Drop firms with merger events in the test period (1,553) (1,423) 
Drop firms that were not in the sample for the 
same quarter of both years (2,468) (3,442) 
Drop firms that changed auditors during test 
period (762) (762) 
Firms in sample 4,298  4,298  
    
 
 





Firms in sample for one quarter 116 
Firms in sample for two quarters 61 
Firms in sample for three quarters 72 
Firms in sample for four quarters 961 
Total 1,210 


















All Firms Yes No 
10 Metal Mining 66 34 32 
12 Coal Mining 10 0 10 
13 Oil and Gas Extraction 326 70 256 
14 Mng, Quarry Nonmtl Minerals 48 6 42 
15 Bldg Cnstr – Gen Contr, Op Bldr 8 0 8 
16 Heavy Construction 20 8 12 
17 Construction – Special Trade 24 12 12 
20 Food Products 220 36 184 
21 Tobacco Products 20 6 14 
22 Textile Mill Products 54 12 42 
23 Apparel & Other Finished Pds 44 24 20 
24 Lumber and Wood (Excl Furn) 50 8 42 
25 Furniture and Fixtures 24 8 16 
26 Paper and Allied Products 104 18 86 
27 Printing, Publishing and Allied 98 34 64 
28 Chemical and Allied Products 1416 492 924 
29 Petroleum Refining and Related 46 14 32 
30 Rubber & Misc Plastic Prod 142 12 130 
31 Leather and Leather Products 44 24 20 
32 Stone, Clay, Glass, Concrete Prod 70 10 60 
33 Primary Metal Industries 196 26 170 
34 Fabricated Metal 184 24 160 
35 Industrial, Comml Machinery 622 296 326 
36 Electrical 746 300 446 
37 Transportation Equipment 182 42 140 
38 Meas Instr, Photo Goods 860 460 400 
39 Misc Manufacturing Indust 90 44 46 
45 Transportation by Air 86 18 68 
46 Pipe Lines  2 0 2 





Table 2 (continued) 











All Firms Yes No 
50 Durable Goods – Wholesale 206 58 148 
51 Nondurable Goods – Wholesale 86 50 36 
52 Bldg Matl, Hardwr, Garden 32 6 26 
53 General Merchandise 8 2 6 
54 Food Stores 38 10 28 
55 Auto Dealers, Gas Stations 18 6 12 
56 Apparel and Accessory Stores 24 14 10 
57 Home Furniture & Equip Store 52 32 20 
58 Eating and Drinking Places 222 38 184 
59 Miscellaneous Retail 130 80 50 
65 Real Estate 40 4 36 
67 Holding, Other Investment Offices 138 78 60 
70 Hotels, Other Lodging 60 22 38 
72 Personal Services 38 12 26 
73 Business Services 1,418 848 570 
75 Auto Repair, Services, Parking 24 0 24 
76 Misc Repair Services 6 4 2 
78 Motion Pictures 40 18 22 
79 Amusements, Recreation 182 116 66 
 
Total 8,596 3,436 5,160 
 
 





Sample Descriptive Statistics - Difference in Sample Means 
Full Sample (Pre-Sox versus Post-SOX) 
 









 Quarters Sample 
(n=1,006)   
Variable  Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation  Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation  
Difference in sample 
Means 
ABSPAAC   0.073  0.034  0.195   0.069  0.027  0.217   -0.004  
SOX   0.000  0.000  0.000   1.000  1.000  0.000   NA 
Size   4.492  4.504  2.312   4.111  4.101  2.459   -0.381 *** 
BIGN
b
   0.740  1.000  0.439   0.740  1.000  0.439   0.000  
CFO   -0.031  -0.008  0.106   -0.047  -0.005  0.184   -0.016 ** 
Distress   -3.531  -3.917  2.431   -2.536  -3.975  7.743   0.995 *** 
MTB   2.894  1.537  9.504   2.096  1.226  6.657   -0.798 ** 







Table 3 (continued) 
Sample Descriptive Statistics - Difference in Sample Means 
Full Sample (Pre-Sox versus Post-SOX) 
 









 Quarters Sample 
(n=1,045)   
Variable  Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation  Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation  
Difference in Sample 
Means 
ABSPAAC   0.118  0.043  0.335   0.130  0.047  0.312   0.012  
SOX   0.000  0.000  0.000   1.000  1.000  0.000   NA 
Size   4.559  4.565  2.379   4.359  4.416  2.448   -0.200 * 
BIGN
b
   0.727  1.000  0.446   0.727  1.000  0.446   0.000  
CFO   -0.066  -0.002  0.226   -0.078  0.009  0.311   -0.012  
Distress   -3.331  -3.959  3.264   -2.620  -3.983  7.241   0.711 *** 
MTB   4.011  1.930  11.626   2.525  1.578  10.535   -1.486 *** 





Table 3 (continued) 
Sample Descriptive Statistics - Difference in Sample Means 
Full Sample (Pre-Sox versus Post-SOX) 
 









 Quarters Sample 
(n=1,072)   
Variable  Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation  Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation  
Difference in Sample 
Means 
ABSPAAC   0.187  0.067  0.436   0.213  0.083  0.418   0.026  
SOX   0.000  0.000  0.000   1.000  1.000  0.000   NA 
Size   4.212  4.173  2.389   4.489  4.669  2.437   0.277 *** 
BIGN
b
   0.722  1.000  0.448   0.722  1.000  0.448   0.000  
CFO   -0.113  0.007  0.409   -0.136  0.024  0.566   -0.023  
Distress   -3.138  -3.940  3.934   -2.437  -4.013  8.191   0.701 ** 
MTB   1.590  1.291  7.486   3.179  1.803  11.764   1.589 *** 






Table 3 (continued) 
Sample Descriptive Statistics - Difference in Sample Means 
Full Sample (Pre-Sox versus Post-SOX) 
 









 Quarters Sample 
(n=1,175)   
Variable  Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation  Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation  
Difference in Sample 
Means 
ABSPAAC   0.255  0.092  0.522   0.220  0.091  0.413   -0.035 * 
SOX   0.000  0.000  0.000   1.000  1.000  0.000   NA 
Size   4.387  4.504  2.525   4.653  4.790  2.442   0.266 *** 
BIGN
b
   0.714  1.000  0.452   0.714  1.000  0.452   0.000  
CFO   -0.131  0.033  0.537   -0.134  0.042  0.607   -0.003  
Distress   -2.768  -3.873  5.095   -2.040  -3.989  9.054   0.728 ** 
MTB   2.599  1.703  9.753   3.820  2.138  11.395   1.221 *** 
Leverage   0.333  0.173  0.697   0.474  0.179  1.371    0.141 *** 
 
Test for differences in the means: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% in two-tailed tests. 
a  Pre-SOX quarters are in 2001; post-SOX quarters are in 2003. 






Table 3 (continued) 
Sample Descriptive Statistics - Difference in Sample Means 
Full Sample (Pre-Sox versus Post-SOX) 
 
Variable Definitions (firm and quarter subscripts are not presented for simplicity): 
 
ABSPAAC  =   absolute value of performance-adjusted discretionary accruals calculated using the Ball and 
Shivakumar (2006) piecewise adjustment to the Modified Jones Model for firm i in quarter t; 
SOX =  1 if the quarterly financial statement is for a quarter in 2003, 0 otherwise; 
Size =   natural log of the market value of equity for firm i at the beginning of the quarter (t-1) [Compustat 
item #13 (price) * Compustat item # 61 (common stock outstanding)]; 
BIGN = 1 if firm i  is audited by a Big N firm in quarter t, 0 otherwise;  
CFO =   firm i’s quarterly cash flow from operations from the Statement of Cash Flows in quarter t 
(Compustat item # 108) scaled by beginning of the quarter total assets (Compustat item # 44 in 
quarter t-1); 
Distress =   Zmijewski’s (1984) financial condition index for firm i in quarter t; 
MTB =   market value of firm i  divided by the book value of assets measured at the beginning of the quarter 
t; 
Leverage =   total debt [Compustat item # 45 (short term debt) + Compustat item # 51 (long term debt)] divided 








Regressions with Dependent Variable Absolute Value of Performance –Adjusted Abnormal 
Accruals   
Full Sample (No Division in Sample for Extreme Earnings Management) 
 
ABSPAACfq = α0 + β1SOXfq + β2Sizefq + β3BIGNfq + β4CFfq + β5Distressfq 
+ β6MTBfq + β7Leveragefq + ε 
 









Q1    -0.018 ***  -0.011 **  -0.015 * 
Adj R2    0.257  0.184  0.328 
Q2    0.006   0.032 ***  -0.012  
Adj R2    0.266  0.311  0.331 
Q3    0.013   0.043 ***  -0.013  
Adj R2    0.370  0.490  0.330 
Q4    -0.030 **  0.009   -0.052 ** 






Table 4 (continued) 
 
Regressions with Dependent Variable Absolute Value of Performance –Adjusted Abnormal 
Accruals – Full Sample (No Division in Sample for Extreme Earnings Management) 
 
ABSPAACfq = α0 + β1SOXfq + β2Sizefq + β3BIGNfq + β4CFfq + β5Distressfq 
+ β6MTBfq + β7Leveragefq + ε 
 













SOX  -  -0.018 ***  -0.011 **  -0.015 * 
Size  -  -0.001   -0.002   0.003  
BIGN  -  -0.028 ***  -0.017 *   -0.039 ** 
CF  -  -0.125   -0.181 ***  -0.039 
Distress  +  0.048 ***  0.016   0.067 ** 
MTB  +  0.001   0.001 *  0.002  
Leverage  -  -0.221 **  -0.018   -0.331 ** 
Intercept    0.312 ***  0.145   0.402 *** 
      
N    2012  1032  980 
F-statistic    10.69  10.09  5.93 
P-value    0.000  0.000  0.000 







Table 4 (continued) 
Regressions with Dependent Variable Absolute Value of Performance –Adjusted Abnormal 
Accruals – Full Sample (No Division in Sample for Extreme Earnings Management) 
 













SOX  -  0.006   0.032 ***  -0.012  
Size  -  -0.004   -0.003   -0.005   
BIGN  -  -0.043 ***  -0.034 *   -0.027   
CF  -  -0.333 ***  -0.341 ***   -0.212 * 
Distress  +  0.033 **  0.013   0.081 *** 
MTB  +  0.002   0.001   0.001  
Leverage  -  -0.121 *  -0.007   -0.429 *** 
Intercept    0.282 ***  0.150 **  0.545 *** 
      
N    2090  1100  990 
F-statistic    18.01  18.78  8.60 
P-value    0.000  0.000  0.000 







Table 4 (continued) 
Regressions with Dependent Variable Absolute Value of Performance –Adjusted Abnormal 
Accruals – Full Sample (No Division in Sample for Extreme Earnings Management) 
 













SOX  -  0.013   0.043 ***  -0.013  
Size  -  -0.008 ***  -0.006 **  -0.010 **  
BIGN  -  -0.044 **  -0.030 *   -0.077 *  
CF  -  -0.316 ***  -0.378 ***   -0.250 *** 
Distress  +  0.054 **  0.057   0.058 ** 
MTB  +  0.000   -0.001   0.001  
Leverage  -  -0.250 *  -0.368   -0.252 * 
Intercept    0.466 ***  0.454 *  0.543 *** 
      
N    2144  1124  1020 
F-statistic    33.58  25.49  12.07 
P-value    0.000  0.000  0.000 







Table 4 (continued) 
Regressions with Dependent Variable Absolute Value of Performance –Adjusted Abnormal 
Accruals – Full Sample (No Division in Sample for Extreme Earnings Management) 
 












SOX  -  -0.030 **  0.009   -0.052 ** 
Size  -  -0.012 ***  -0.014 ***  -0.004  
BIGN  -  -0.071 ***  -0.049 *   -0.090 **  
CF  -  -0.275 ***  -0.334 ***  -0.212 *** 
Distress  +  0.043 **  0.005   0.074 *** 
MTB  +  -0.002 *  -0.002   -0.005  
Leverage  -  -0.220 **  -0.001   -0.398 *** 
Intercept    0.523 ***  0.283 *  0.687 *** 
      
N    2350  1226  1124 
F-statistic    36.29  26.38  18.48 
P-value    0.000  0.000  0.000 
Adjusted R2    0.325  0.366  0.351 
 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% based on one-tailed (two-tailed) tests for variables 
whose relation to the dependent variable is (is not) predicted.   
 





Sample Descriptive Statistics - Difference in Sample Means  
Extreme Earnings Management versus Low Earnings Management Subsamples 
 
 
Panel A: First Quarter Samples: 
 
  
Extreme Earnings Management  
Sample 
a
 (n=804)  
Low Earnings Management 
Sample (n=1,208)   
Variable
 b
  Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation  Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation  
Difference in Sample 
Means 
ABSPAAC   0.129  0.073  0.303   0.033  0.019  0.080   0.096 *** 
SOX   0.500  0.500  0.500   0.500  0.500  0.500   0.000 
Size   3.591  3.618  2.283   4.775  4.705  2.349   -1.184 *** 
BIGN   0.637  1.000  0.481   0.808  1.000  0.394   -0.171 *** 
CFO   -0.074  -0.024  0.207   -0.015  0.002  0.088   -0.059 *** 
Distress   -2.219  -3.900  7.981   -3.576  -3.960  3.485   1.357 *** 
MTB   2.834  1.274  9.923   2.269  1.405  6.838   0.565  







Table 5 (continued) 
Sample Descriptive Statistics - Difference in Sample Means  
Extreme Earnings Management versus Low Earnings Management Subsamples 
 
Panel B: Second Quarter Samples: 
 
  
Extreme Earnings Management 
Sample 
a
 (n=836)  
Low Earnings Management 
Sample (n=1,254)   
Variable
 b
  Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation  Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation  
Difference in Sample 
Means 
ABSPAAC   0.219  0.106  0.440   0.061  0.027  0.190   0.158 *** 
SOX   0.500  0.500  0.500   0.500  0.500  0.500   0.000 
Size   3.810  3.842  2.359   4.891  4.903  2.355   -1.081 *** 
BIGN   0.605  1.000  0.489   0.809  1.000  0.394   -0.204 *** 
CFO   -0.154  -0.034  0.367   -0.018  0.018  0.161   -0.136 *** 
Distress   -1.966  -3.918  8.049   -3.648  -3.995  2.909   1.682 *** 
MTB   3.710  1.530  14.146   2.973  1.784  8.511   0.737  





Table 5 (continued) 
Sample Descriptive Statistics - Difference in Sample Means  
Extreme Earnings Management versus Low Earnings Management Subsamples 
 
Panel C: Third Quarter Samples: 
 
  
Extreme Earnings Management  
Sample 
a
 (n=856)  
Low Earnings Management 
Sample (n=1,288)   
Variable
 b
  Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation  Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation  
Difference in Sample 
Means 
ABSPAAC   0.366  0.179  0.601   0.090  0.041  0.183   0.276 *** 
SOX   0.500  0.500  0.500   0.500  0.500  0.500   0.000 
Size   3.572  3.462  2.295   4.868  4.978  2.357   -1.296 *** 
BIGN   0.603  1.000  0.490   0.801  1.000  0.399   -0.198 *** 
CFO   -0.281  -0.058  0.649   -0.020  0.036  0.314   -0.262 ***  
Distress   -1.517  -3.843  9.124   -3.632  -4.000  3.439   2.115 *** 
MTB   2.485  1.383  12.923   2.317  1.582  7.204   0.167  






Table 5 (continued) 
Sample Descriptive Statistics - Difference in Sample Means  
Extreme Earnings Management versus Low Earnings Management Subsamples 
 
Panel D: Fourth Quarter Samples: 
 
  
Extreme Earnings Management  
Sample 
a
 (n=940)  
Low Earnings Management 
Sample (n=1,410)   
Variable
 b
  Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation  Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation  
Difference in Sample 
Means 
ABSPAAC   0.463  0.237  0.665   0.087  0.053  0.137   0.376 *** 
SOX   0.500  0.500  0.500   0.500  0.500  0.500   0.000 
Size   3.672  3.583  2.381   5.085  5.238  2.395   -1.414 *** 
BIGN   0.579  1.000  0.494   0.804  1.000  0.397   -0.226 *** 
CFO   -0.352  -0.073  0.789   0.013  0.073  0.281   -0.365 *** 
Distress   -0.586  -3.795  11.010   -3.616  -3.972  2.388   3.030 *** 
MTB   3.847  1.822  14.371   2.784  1.936  7.069   1.063 ** 
Leverage   0.617  0.136  1.633   0.262  0.198  0.387    0.355 *** 
 
Test for differences in the means: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% in two-tailed tests. 
a  The extreme earnings management sample is identified as the 20% of firms with the highest (positive) and the 20% of firms with the highest 
(negative) abnormal accruals in each quarter of  the pre-SOX period (2001).  The mean, median and standard deviation are calculated for each the 
two groups of companies (extreme earnings management and low earnings management).   







Sample Descriptive Statistics - Difference in Sample Means 
Extreme Earnings Management Subsample – (Pre-SOX versus Post-SOX) 
 
Panel A: First Quarter Samples: 
 
  
Extreme Earnings Management  Sample 
a
 (n=804)  
















Sample Means  
ABSPAAC   0.155  0.103  -0.052 ***   0.019  0.047  0.028 ***  
Size   3.808  3.375  -0.433 ***   4.948  4.602  -0.346 **  
BIGN
c
   0.637  0.637  0.000    0.808  0.808  0.000   
CFO   -0.065  -0.084  0.019    -0.009  -0.022  -0.013 ***  
Distress   -3.072  -1.366  1.706 ***   -3.837  -3.315  0.522 ***  
MTB   3.532  2.136  -1.396 **   2.470  2.069  -0.401   







Table 6 (continued) 
Sample Descriptive Statistics - Difference in Sample Means 
Extreme Earnings Management Subsample – (Pre-SOX versus Post-SOX) 
 
 
Panel B: Second Quarter Samples: 
 
  
Extreme Earnings Management  Sample 
a
 (n=836)  
















Sample Means  
ABSPAAC   0.259  0.179  -0.080 ***   0.024  0.097  0.073 ***  
Size   3.951  3.670  -0.281 *   4.965  4.818  -0.147   
BIGN
c
   0.605  0.605  0.000    0.809  0.809  0.000   
CFO   -0.156  -0.152  0.004    -0.006  -0.029  -0.023 **  
Distress   -2.583  -1.349  1.234 **   -3.830  -3.467  0.363 **  
MTB   5.251  2.170  -3.081 ***   3.184  2.762  -0.422   







Table 6 (continued) 
Sample Descriptive Statistics - Difference in Sample Means 
Extreme Earnings Management Subsample – (Pre-SOX versus Post-SOX) 
 
 
Panel C: Third Quarter Samples: 
 
  
Extreme Earnings Management  Sample 
a
 (n=856)  
















Sample Means  
ABSPAAC   0.414  0.318  -0.096 **   0.036  0.143  0.107 ***  
Size   3.380  3.764  0.384 **   4.765  4.971  0.206   
BIGN
c
   0.603  0.603  0.000    0.801  0.801  0.000   
CFO   -0.276  -0.286  -0.010    -0.004  -0.036  -0.032 *  
Distress   -2.311  -0.724  1.587 ***   -3.688  -3.575  0.113   
MTB   1.507  3.463  1.956 **   1.645  2.990  1.345 ***  







Table 6 (continued) 
Sample Descriptive Statistics - Difference in Sample Means 
Extreme Earnings Management Subsample – (Pre-SOX versus Post-SOX) 
 
 
Panel D: Fourth Quarter Samples: 
 
  
Extreme Earnings Management  Sample 
a
 (n=940)  
















Sample Means  
ABSPAAC   0.562  0.364  -0.198 ***   0.051  0.124  0.073 ***  
Size   3.497  3.847  -0.350 **   4.980  5.190  0.210 *  
BIGN
c
   0.579  0.579  0.000    0.804  0.804  0.000   
CFO   -0.361  -0.342  0.019    0.022  0.005  -0.017 **  
Distress   -1.419  0.247  1.666 **   -3.666  -3.357  0.101   
MTB   2.865  4.829  1.964 **   2.421  3.147  0.726 *  
Leverage   0.461  0.773  0.312 ***   0.248  0.275  0.027    
 
 
Test for differences in the means: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% in two-tailed tests. 
a  The extreme earnings management sample is identified as the 20% of firms with the highest (positive) and the 20% of firms with the highest 
(negative) abnormal accruals in each quarter of  the pre-SOX period (2001).  The mean, median and standard deviation are calculated for each the 
two groups of companies (extreme earnings management and low earnings management).   
b  All variables are defined at Table 3. 






Regressions with Dependent Variable Absolute Value of Performance –Adjusted Abnormal Accruals 
Extreme Earnings Management Subsample 
 
ABSPAACfq = α0 + β1SOXfq + β2Sizefq + β3BIGNfq + β4CFfq + β5Distressfq + β6MTBfq + β7Leveragefq + ε 
 
Panel A: SOX Variable Summary – Coefficient Value, Significance and Adjusted R-Squared: 
 
   Extreme Earnings Management Sample 
a
 Low Earnings Management Sample 
SOX 









Q1    -0.070 ***  -0.054 ***  -0.062 ***  0.019 ***  0.017 ***  0.022 *** 
Adj R2    0.267  0.241  0.349  0.266  0.351  0.147 
Q2    -0.079 ***  -0.030 *  -0.113 ***  0.064 ***  0.070 ***  0.058 *** 
Adj R2    0.273  0.364  0.348  0.200  0.208  0.240 
Q3    -0.118 ***  -0.038   -0.182 ***  0.101 ***  0.096 ***  0.101 *** 
Adj R2    0.393  0.435  0.388  0.393  0.522  0.312 
Q4    -0.184 ***  -0.072 **  -0.260 ***  0.074 ***  0.068 ***  0.078 *** 





Table 7 (continued) 
Regressions with Dependent Variable Absolute Value of Performance –Adjusted Abnormal Accruals 
Extreme Earnings Management Subsample 
 
ABSPAACfq = α0 + β1SOXfq + β2Sizefq + β3BIGNfq + β4CFfq + β5Distressfq + β6MTBfq + β7Leveragefq + ε 
Panel B: First Quarter Samples: 
 
   



















SOX  -  -0.070 ***  -0.054 ***  -0.062 ***  0.019 ***  0.017 ***  0.022 *** 
Size  -  0.007   0.001   0.012   0.000   0.000   0.000  
BIGN  -  -0.044 **  -0.012    -0.061 *  -0.008   0.003  -0.021 *** 
CF  -  -0.183   -0.206 **  0.094  -0.114 **  -0.127 ***  -0.087 * 
Distress  +  0.049 **  -0.012 **  0.069 **  0.040 **  0.044 *  0.031 ** 
MTB  +  0.002   0.001 *   0.002   0.000   0.000   0.000  
Leverage  -  -0.200 *  0.207 **  -0.317 **  -0.229 **  -0.246 *  -0.177 ** 
Intercept    0.357 ***  0.024   0.440 ***  0.238 **  0.250 *  0.195 *** 
N    804  412  392  1208  620  588 
F-statistic    9.04  7.96  5.25  13.27  7.60  6.29 
P-value    0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 





Table 7 (continued) 
Regressions with Dependent Variable Absolute Value of Performance –Adjusted Abnormal Accruals 
Extreme Earnings Management Subsample 
 
ABSPAACfq = α0 + β1SOXfq + β2Sizefq + β3BIGNfq + β4CFfq + β5Distressfq + β6MTBfq + β7Leveragefq + ε 
 
Panel C: Second Quarter Samples: 
 
   



















SOX  -  -0.079 ***  -0.030 *  -0.113 ***  0.064 ***  0.070 ***  0.058 *** 
Size  -  0.002   -0.001   0.007   -0.007 **  -0.002   -0.012 ** 
BIGN  -  -0.082 ***  -0.056 **   -0.075   0.019   0.015   0.026  
CF  -  -0.350 ***  -0.311 ***  -0.299 *  -0.114   -0.252 ***  0.124 
Distress  +  0.029 **  0.012   0.076 ***  0.045 **  0.033   0.059 * 
MTB  +  0.001   0.000   0.000   0.003   0.003   0.000  
Leverage  -  -0.100   0.017   -0.411 ***  -0.168 **  -0.143   -0.223 * 
Intercept    0.353 ***  0.225 **  0.593 ***  0.246 **  0.167   0.341 * 
N    836  440  396  1254  660  594 
F-statistic    13.43  15.12  7.18  13.81  10.92  11.40 
P-value    0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 




Table 7 (continued) 
Regressions with Dependent Variable Absolute Value of Performance –Adjusted Abnormal Accruals 
Extreme Earnings Management Subsample 
 
ABSPAACfq = α0 + β1SOXfq + β2Sizefq + β3BIGNfq + β4CFfq + β5Distressfq + β6MTBfq + β7Leveragefq + ε 
 
Panel D: Third Quarter Samples: 
 
   



















SOX  -  -0.118 ***  -0.038   -0.182 ***  0.101 ***  0.096 ***  0.101 *** 
Size  -  -0.005   -0.016 *  0.005   -0.002   0.004   -0.007 ** 
BIGN  -  -0.056 *  -0.007   -0.138 *  -0.017 *  -0.022 *  -0.011  
CF  -  -0.246 ***  -0.330 ***  -0.249 **  -0.325 ***  -0.394 ***  -0.148 ** 
Distress  +  0.092 ***  0.060   0.097 ***  -0.022 ***  0.037 **  -0.015 ** 
MTB  +  0.000   -0.001   0.002   -0.003 **  -0.003 *  -0.002  
Leverage  -  -0.455 ***  -0.389   -0.472 ***  0.135 ***  -0.217 **  0.130 *** 
Intercept    0.786 ***  0.597 *  0.882 ***  -0.056   0.235   -0.011  
N    856  448  408  1288  676  612 
F-statistic    25.94  16.73  12.38  34.24  24.03  21.75 
P-value    0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 




Table 7 (continued) 
Regressions with Dependent Variable Absolute Value of Performance –Adjusted Abnormal Accruals 
Extreme Earnings Management Subsample 
 
ABSPAACfq = α0 + β1SOXfq + β2Sizefq + β3BIGNfq + β4CFfq + β5Distressfq + β6MTBfq + β7Leveragefq + ε 
 
Panel E: Fourth Quarter Samples: 
 
   



















SOX  -  -0.184 ***  -0.072 **  -0.260 ***  0.074 ***  0.068 ***  0.078 *** 
Size  -  -0.010   -0.021 **  0.015   -0.008 ***  -0.005 **  -0.009 *** 
BIGN  -  -0.104 **  -0.037    -0.199 **  0.003   -0.010  0.010  
CF  -  -0.253 ***  -0.323 ***  -0.197 ***  -0.081 **  -0.126 ***  -0.051 * 
Distress  +  0.040 **  0.001   0.070 ***  0.005   0.004   0.001  
MTB  +  -0.004 **  -0.003   -0.007 **  0.000   -0.001   0.001  
Leverage  -  -0.203 *  0.040   -0.380 ***  -0.014   -0.054   0.034  
Intercept    0.727 ***  0.417 ***  0.916 ***  0.111 ***  0.116   0.081 ** 
N    940  490  450  1410  736  674 
F-statistic    27.22  18.63  14.81  17.23  9.21  9.43 
P-value    0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 




Table 7 (continued) 
Regressions with Dependent Variable Absolute Value of Performance –Adjusted Abnormal Accruals 
Extreme Earnings Management Subsample 
 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% based on one-tailed (two-tailed) tests for variables whose relation to the dependent 
variable is (is not) predicted.   
 
a The extreme earnings management sample is identified as the 20% of firms with the highest (positive) and the 20% of firms with the lowest 
(negative) abnormal accruals in each quarter of  the pre-SOX period (2001).   








Panel Regression (Fixed Effects) Dependent Variable Absolute Value of Performance –Adj. Abnormal Accruals 
Extreme Earnings Management Subsample 
 
ABSPAACfq = α0 + β1SOXfq + β2Sizefq + β3BIGNfq + β4CFfq + β5Distressfq + β6MTBfq + β7Leveragefq + ε 
 
Panel A: SOX Variable Summary – Coefficient Value, Significance and Adjusted R-Squared: 
 
   Extreme Earnings Management Sample 
a
 Low Earnings Management Sample 
SOX 









Q1    -0.056 ***  -0.069 ***  -0.034 *  0.019 ***  0.017 **  0.022 *** 
Adj R2    0.170  0.213  0.192  0.179  0.208  0.079 
Q2    -0.066 ***  -0.021   -0.121 ***  0.064 ***  0.070 ***  0.059 *** 
Adj R2    0.196  0.321  0.228  0.152  0.148  0.205 
Q3    -0.116 ***  -0.028   -0.184 ***  0.094 ***  0.089 ***  0.095 *** 
Adj R2    0.379  0.425  0.380  0.340  0.481  0.271 
Q4    -0.191 ***  -0.075 *  -0.273 ***  0.075 ***  0.071 ***  0.079 *** 





Table 8 (continued) 
Panel Regression (Fixed Effects) Dependent Variable Absolute Value of Performance –Adj. Abnormal Accruals 
Extreme Earnings Management Subsample 
 
ABSPAACfq = α0 + β1SOXfq + β2Sizefq + β3BIGNfq + β4CFfq + β5Distressfq + β6MTBfq + β7Leveragefq + ε 
 
Panel B: First Quarter Samples: 
 
   Extreme Earnings Management Sample 
a






















SOX  -  -0.056 ***  -0.069 ***  -0.034 *  0.019 ***  0.017 **  0.022 *** 
Size  -  0.044 **  -0.022 *  0.081 *  0.012 **  0.019 **  0.008  
CF  -  0.169   -0.117   0.339  -0.005   0.120   -0.017  
Distress  +  0.055 **  -0.015   0.075 ***  0.071 ***  0.076 **  0.060 ** 
MTB  +  0.002   0.002    0.000   0.000   0.000   0.001  
Leverage  -  -0.213 *  0.256   -0.313 **  -0.339 ***  -0.390 **  -0.334 ** 
Intercept    0.220 *  0.088   0.168   0.326 **  0.324 **  0.287 ** 
F-statistic    9.78 ***  6.66 ***  5.68 ***  10.31 ***  7.64 ***  5.30 *** 
Within R2    0.259  0.162  0.391  0.389  0.505  0.226 
Between R2    0.119  0.279  0.101  0.096  0.112  0.019 




Table 8 (continued) 
Panel Regression (Fixed Effects) Dependent Variable Absolute Value of Performance –Adj. Abnormal Accruals 
Extreme Earnings Management Subsample 
 
ABSPAACfq = α0 + β1SOXfq + β2Sizefq + β3BIGNfq + β4CFfq + β5Distressfq + β6MTBfq + β7Leveragefq + ε 
 
Panel C: Second Quarter Samples: 
 
   Extreme Earnings Management  Sample 
a






















SOX  -  -0.066 ***  -0.021   -0.121 ***  0.064 ***  0.070 ***  0.059 *** 
Size  -  0.010   0.014   0.018   0.007   0.023   -0.008  
CF  -  -0.364 ***  -0.308 ***  -0.467 **  0.100   -0.305 **  0.541  
Distress  +  0.006   0.015   0.020   0.060 **  0.051   0.073 * 
MTB  +  0.002   0.001    0.004   0.002   0.003   -0.001  
Leverage  -  -0.031   0.010   -0.130   -0.163 *  -0.209   -0.185  
Intercept    0.175   0.137   0.256   0.254   0.141   0.385  
F-statistic    7.32 ***  4.88 ***  3.63 ***  11.66 ***  10.88 ***  6.12 *** 
Within R2    0.105  0.175  0.141  0.252  0.233  0.341 
Between R2    0.244  0.414  0.273  0.087  0.101  0.134 




Table 8 (continued) 
Panel Regression (Fixed Effects) Dependent Variable Absolute Value of Performance –Adj. Abnormal Accruals 
Extreme Earnings Management Subsample 
 
ABSPAACfq = α0 + β1SOXfq + β2Sizefq + β3BIGNfq + β4CFfq + β5Distressfq + β6MTBfq + β7Leveragefq + ε 
 
Panel D: Third Quarter Samples: 
 
   Extreme Earnings Management  Sample 
a






















SOX  -  -0.116 ***  -0.028   -0.184 ***  0.094 ***  0.089 ***  0.095 *** 
Size  -  -0.007   -0.018   0.002   0.010   0.017   -0.014  
CF  -  -0.267 ***  -0.354 ***  -0.221 *  -0.386 ***  -0.413 ***  -0.169 * 
Distress  +  0.071 **  0.063   0.078 **  -0.039 ***  0.089 **  -0.026 *** 
MTB  +  0.002   0.000    0.002   -0.002   -0.003   0.000  
Leverage  -  -0.347 *  -0.472   -0.363 **  0.306 ***  -0.556 **  0.265 *** 
Intercept    0.662 ***  0.629   0.731 ***  -0.235 ***  0.436 *  -0.059  
F-statistic    8.29 ***  8.95 ***  4.59 ***  37.08 ***  19.34 ***  29.33 *** 
Within R2    0.189  0.230  0.213  0.425  0.545  0.383 
Between R2    0.467  0.549  0.450  0.292  0.427  0.242 




Table 8 (continued) 
Panel Regression (Fixed Effects) Dependent Variable Absolute Value of Performance –Adj. Abnormal Accruals 
Extreme Earnings Management Subsample 
 
ABSPAACfq = α0 + β1SOXfq + β2Sizefq + β3BIGNfq + β4CFfq + β5Distressfq + β6MTBfq + β7Leveragefq + ε 
 
Panel E: Fourth Quarter Samples: 
 
   Extreme Earnings Management Sample 
a






















SOX  -  -0.191 ***  -0.075 *  -0.273 ***  0.075 ***  0.071 ***  0.079 *** 
Size  -  -0.017   -0.015   0.005   -0.011   -0.015 *  -0.015  
CF  -  -0.209 **  -0.403 ***  -0.121  0.074   -0.115   0.180 * 
Distress  +  0.025 *  -0.007   0.047 **  0.003   -0.020   0.005  
MTB  +  -0.001   0.000    -0.006   -0.001   -0.001   0.002  
Leverage  -  -0.116   0.116   -0.231 **  0.054   0.020   0.074  
Intercept    0.635 ***  0.317 *  0.765 ***  0.101 *  0.052   0.108 * 
F-statistic    8.52 ***  6.62 ***  5.41 ***  21.04 ***  10.00 ***  13.76 *** 
Within R2    0.133  0.173  0.192  0.163  0.167  0.247 
Between R2    0.402  0.445  0.426  0.005  0.115  0.000 





Table 8 (continued) 
Panel Regression (Fixed Effects) Dependent Variable Absolute Value of Performance –Adj. Abnormal Accruals 
Extreme Earnings Management Subsample 
 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% based on one-tailed (two-tailed) tests for variables whose relation to the dependent 
variable is (is not) predicted.   
 
a The extreme earnings management sample is identified as the 20% of firms with the highest (positive) and the 20% of firms with the lowest 
(negative) abnormal accruals in each quarter of  the pre-SOX period (2001).   
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